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ABSTRACT
This dissertation builds on the logic of opportunity and the institutional perspective to
explore how firms iterate to innovate in the uneven landscape of the global digital
marketplace. In such nascent industries, innovative firms could not rely on differential
positioning or valuable resources to sustain advantage but must take actions of iterative
search to capture fleeting opportunities. Specifically, I focus on the role of design
iteration, through which firms engage in trial-and-error learning and create situationspecific knowledge. While this logic of opportunity has received a significant upsurge of
interest from strategy and entrepreneurship scholars, it largely assumes a homogeneous
institutional environment in which nascent industries are embedded. The assumption
mostly holds because new industries emerge in advanced economies with similar
institutions. However, as innovation becomes increasingly democratized on a global scale,
firms operating in heterogeneous institutional contexts can simultaneously partake in
nascent industries. It is therefore important for us to understand how firms should
strategize design iteration to pursue distinctive flows of opportunities in/across various
institutional contexts. Specifically, I develop three essays around this important inquiry in
the context of the global mobile application industry. First, while extant research advises
firms to continually iterate designs, I unveil the hidden dark side of design iteration using
a difference-in-differences design based on mobile game apps that multihome on two
platforms. In my second essay, I investigate how firms navigate varying levels of
institutional uncertainty by strategizing their design iteration. I find that frequent design
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iterations enable firms to overcome high institutional uncertainty and capture
opportunities to innovate new products. This study extends the logic of opportunity and a
dynamic view of institutions. Third, I further explore how digital startups strategize
iteration with rhythms to compete simultaneously across different institutional contexts. I
find that while digital startups tend to iterate product designs with rhythms, they
strategize such iteration rhythms differently to align with their international
diversification conditions. My dissertation takes an initial but important step toward
infusing opportunity logic with the institutional perspective and develops a rigorous,
quantifiable, and generalizable understanding of how firms iterate to innovate in the
global digital marketplace.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores how firms iterate to innovate in the uneven landscape of the
global digital marketplace. Understanding how firms innovate in nascent industries such
as the digital marketplace is theoretically intriguing, because it pushes beyond the
boundary of the traditional strategic logics (e.g., position, leverage) to the less-understood
opportunity logic (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2008; Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017). In
nascent industries, where business landscapes are characterized by turbulent changes,
abundant flows of short-lived, unpredictable opportunities emerge. In such settings,
innovative firms could not rely on differential positioning or valuable resources to sustain
advantage but must take actions of iterative search to capture fleeting opportunities (Ott,
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017). Particularly, an important form of such iterative search is
design iteration (e.g., mobile app updates), through which firms test and tune product
designs based on market feedback (Chen, Wang, Cui, & Li, 2020; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi,
1995). By iterating product designs, firms can rapidly create situation-specific new
knowledge and better sense and seize the newly emerged opportunities for innovation
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Therefore, I seek to develop and examine the understudied
strategic logic of opportunity by focusing on how firms iterate to innovate digital
products.
While the opportunity logic has received a significant upsurge of interest from
strategy and entrepreneurship scholars, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional
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environment in which nascent industries are embedded. Traditionally, most industries
emerged from advanced economies with similar institutional underpinnings, as suggested
by the product lifecycle theory (Vernon, 1979). However, as innovation becomes
increasingly democratized on a global scale (Nambisan, Siegel, & Kenney, 2018), firms
operating in heterogeneous institutional contexts can simultaneously partake in the
development of nascent industries (Chakravorti, Tunnard, & Chaturvedi, 2015). Such
institutional variation could play an important role in explaining firm innovation in
nascent industries (Paik, Kang, & Seamans, 2019). As institutional scholars have drawn
on diverse strands of theories to study the role of such institutional differences (e.g.,
Kostova et al., 2020; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008), there is increasing appreciation that
heterogeneous institutional underpinnings give rise to an uneven opportunity landscape,
where flows of opportunities are shaped distinctively across countries (Banalieva,
Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015; Young, Welter, & Conger, 2018). Ignoring such crosscountry variation in the theoretical background of the opportunity logic would prevent us
from understanding how firms should strategize design iteration to pursue distinctive
flows of opportunities across different countries. Thus, my focus on the uneven landscape
of the global digital marketplace presents an appealing opportunity to infuse the strategic
logic of opportunity with the institutional perspective.
Exploring how firms iterate to innovate in the global digital marketplace is also
practically relevant. Digital innovation has become the primary motor for economic
growth across various regions, contributing 4.5-15.5% of world GDP (UNCTAD, 2019).
Notably, digital innovation is not the privilege of firms from several developed countries
but has spawned into a truly global phenomenon (BCG, 2018). Given its importance,
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practitioners pioneer in creating insights about how firms should manage digital
innovation (e.g., agile software development, Scrum), drawing significant attention to
design iteration activities (e.g., version updates, A/B tests, gray release). It is estimated
that nowadays over 70% of firms engage in design iteration (Langley, 2017) and devote
50-90% of their total expenses to iteration-related activities (Li et al., 2017). Hence, this
dissertation also aims to provide timely and customized insights for managers,
entrepreneurs, and policy makers regarding how to manage design iteration and foster
digital innovation in different countries.
To realize the proposed contributions, I infuse opportunity logic with the
institutional perspective to inquire how firms strategize design iteration to navigate the
uneven landscape of the global digital marketplace. Specifically, I develop three research
questions around this important inquiry and address each one with an essay. First, what is
the hidden cost of design iteration in the global digital marketplace? If design iteration is
truly low-cost, there would be little reason to strategize it in the first place. This is
because firms can iterate product designs any time they want or keep iterating all the time,
creating little between-firm differences. In my first essay, I scrutinize the demand-side
costs of design iteration, which provides an important basis for firms to strategize design
iteration. Second, how should firms strategize design iteration to innovate under varying
levels of institutional uncertainty? In the second essay, I start by investigating how
varying levels of institutional uncertainty across countries may shape the opportunity
landscape for innovation. More importantly, I examine whether iterating extant product
designs facilitates the introduction of new digital products facing high institutional
uncertainty. I argue that innovation under uncertainty relies much less on existing
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knowledge and much more on rapidly creating situation-specific new knowledge through
design iteration. Third, how do firms strategize design iteration when competing
simultaneously in multiple markets? Since many digital firms have internationalized
across multiple country markets, it is important to figure out how firms strategize design
iteration to deal with the heterogeneous opportunity landscapes simultaneously.
Increasing evidence from digital practitioners suggests that firms tend to arrange design
iteration with consistent time intervals. In my third essay, I conceptualize this behavioral
pattern as design iteration rhythms and explore how firms configure such rhythms to
better align with their international/platform diversification strategy. These three
questions are logically linked to each other, and together depict a portrait of how firms
should strategize design iteration to pursue innovation opportunities in/across different
countries in the digital marketplace.
This dissertation is grounded in the global mobile application industry to address
these important research questions with three empirical essays. Nowadays, firms all over
the world can develop and release mobile apps through access to global digital platforms
such as the iOS system and Apple App Store. SensorTower (2020) finds that global
revenue of mobile apps from iOS and Google play has exceeded $83 billion in 2019, with
an unprecedented growth rate of 17%. Moreover, this nascent industry is characterized by
a fast-changing, uncertain institutional environment, where regulations and norms
regarding the use of mobile apps frequently shift unexpectedly (European Commission,
2014). It has been widely recognized that mobile app publishers competing in this
nascent industry pay tremendous attention to design iteration (e.g., app updates), which
revamps extant product designs and collects up-to-date market feedback (Miric &
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Jeppesen, 2020; Yoo, Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012). Drawing upon various data
sources at app, firm and country levels, I compiled a massive dataset on the global mobile
application industry. The resulting dataset covers 1.5 million mobile apps, 7,600 app
publishers, and 58 countries and provides me with critical variables related to app updates,
new app releases, apps’ daily active users, firms’ international diversification, and
country-specific digital-related institutional development. Utilizing this comprehensive
dataset, I developed three empirical essays, each addressing one of the proposed research
questions.
Chapter 1: Growing Pains: The Hidden Dark Side of Design Iteration on Mobile
Games Performance. The first essay in my dissertation challenges the well accepted
perspective that design iteration is beneficial and incurs very little costs (Banbury &
Mitchell, 1995; Lawless & Anderson, 1996). While strategy research mostly advises
firms to capture generative value by continually introducing improvements on their
existing products (Ahuja, Lampert, & Novelli, 2013), this paper scrutinizes the
performance implications of design iteration and unveils a potential dark side. Consider
an app update of Snapchat that caused widespread anger among users. The leading social
networking app lost three million daily active users and suffered from 1.3 million USD
loss in market value in the second quarter of 2018, for which its CEO Evan Spiegel
blamed the newly released update that redesigns the user interface (New York Times,
2018). These arguments and observations suggest considerable heterogeneity in the
performance outcomes of design iteration, and underscore the need for further
investigation given the corresponding implications for firms’ competitiveness.
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I draw on the demand-side perspective to examine consumers’ product adoption
following design iteration (Adner & Levinthal, 2001; Priem, 2007; Wang, Aggarwal, &
Wu, 2020). Because design iteration brings changes to existing products that are already
embedded in consumers’ behavioral patterns, I argue that they are likely to cause frictions
by altering ingrained habits and increasing learning costs for consumers. As a result, I
expect that consumers will be more likely to resist design iteration, rather than engage in
behavioral adjustment, particularly in the short-term. Further, I posit that this negative
effect of design iteration will diminish when the product has a leading market position; it
will be more severe as the product undergoes more design iterations; and it will be
attenuated when the platform the product is affiliated with has experienced a recent
iteration.
My empirical analysis utilizes a unique matched difference-in-differences
research design using data from the mobile games industry. I recognize that design
iteration is a deliberate choice made by firms. For example, seasonal holidays may breed
a spike in product demand, and in response, firms are likely to introduce design iterations
in advance. The identification strategy leverages asynchronous design iterations of
multihoming mobile games (i.e., game apps available on more than one platform). By
comparing the change in daily active users of the upgraded apps (i.e. treatment group)
vis-à-vis the same apps that have yet to be upgraded on the rival platform (i.e. control
group), I can minimize unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., developer traits, app
characteristics, time effects, etc.). Based on 1,610 design iteration events in worldwide
markets, I find supportive evidence for my hypotheses and discuss implications for
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strategy and technology innovation literature. The demand-side costs of design iteration
also provide an important basis for firms to strategize design iteration.
Chapter 2: Design Iteration, Institutional Uncertainty, and Product Innovation:
Evidence from the Global Mobile Application Industry. Being one of the first to infuse
opportunity logic with the institutional perspective, my second essay theorizes how
entrepreneurial firms in different country contexts capture innovation opportunities. The
logic of opportunity suggests that firms must take actions of iterative search to capture
the fleeting innovation opportunities in nascent industries (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017;
Ott, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017). While this logic has considerably enhanced our
understanding, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional context, in which nascent
industries are embedded.
However, with the ubiquity of information and communication technologies,
firms around the world can “plug and play” in global competition to foster the emergence
of nascent industries in different institutional contexts (Chakravorti, Tunnard, &
Chaturvedi, 2015). Although it is well accepted that institutional variation can influence
firm innovation (e.g., Shinkle & McCann, 2014), little is known about how diverse
institutional contexts associated with nascent industries may shape product innovation,
and how firms should take iterative actions to navigate the heterogeneous landscapes.
In addressing these questions, I investigate how various levels of institutional
uncertainty affect firms’ product innovation. While nascent industries are characterized
by substantial institutional uncertainty (Moeen, Agarwal, & Shah, 2020), its variation
across countries is largely overlooked. From opportunity logic, the more uncertain the
external environment, the greater the room for a firm to discover opportunities and to
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innovate new products (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Eisenhardt, 2002). Conversely,
institutional theorists maintain that firms face significant challenges to make long-term
commitments under high uncertainty (Peng, 2003; Xu & Meyer, 2013; Banalieva,
Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015). Combining these contrasting theoretical perspectives, I
propose that there is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and product
innovation in nascent industries.
Moreover, I investigate how firms strategize design iteration to navigate
institutional uncertainty and create product innovations. I argue that design iteration
enables firms to engage in experiential learning, to sense and seize opportunities
embedded in an uncertain and fast-changing setting. In turn, the newly created knowledge
through iteration will help firms better develop innovative solutions to address the unmet
needs in a particular market. Thus, I propose that firms frequently iterating product
designs can better navigate high institutional uncertainty to create product innovations.
Using a sample of 4,629 firms from 54 countries in the mobile app industry during year
2015-2017, my empirical results based on negative binomial analysis provide support for
all my hypotheses.
This study makes several important contributions. First, I contribute to
opportunity logic by highlighting institutional variation in nascent industries. Drawing
upon such institutional variation, I am among the first to theorize and examine how firms
should contextualize their iteration strategies to capture opportunities in different local
contexts. Second, this study extends a dynamic view of institutions to examine the role of
institutional uncertainty in innovation. While the institutional perspective mostly treats
uncertainty as a challenge to overcome, I theorize that the influence of institutional
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uncertainty is twofold, in which opportunities and challenges for innovation coexist.
Third, this study also provides practical implications for digital entrepreneurs and policy
makers.
Chapter 3: Like Clockwork? Design Iteration Rhythms and the Strategy of Digital
Startups. My third essay explores how digital startups strategize design iteration when
competing in multiple markets simultaneously. Particularly, I focus on the understudied
role of design iteration rhythms, exhibiting regular time intervals between design
iterations. Extant literature suggests that rhythms help facilitate coordination and enable
firms to be more focused (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Klarner & Raisch, 2013; Laamanen &
Keil, 2008; Turner & Rindova, 2018; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Moreover, some
very successful digital startups (e.g., SpaceApe) have attributed their extreme growth to
the use of rhythm-related business practices (Batchelor, 2017; Gupta & Rood, 2012), and
have strongly encouraged the approach of fixed time intervals for each cycle of design
iteration. Despite the potential benefits, little consideration has been given to whether and
under what conditions digital startups utilize rhythms to organize design iteration.
To address this gap, I first examine whether digital startups use rhythms for
design iterations. I draw on a coordination logic (Becker, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982)
to argue that digital startups seek to diminish the difficulties in internal coordination and
therefore develop rhythms to organize design iterations. In other words, the considerable
opportunities for coordination efficiencies in design iteration drive these firms to develop
rhythms. Further, I examine the boundary conditions of using design iteration rhythms,
i.e., the conditions under which digital startups prefer to employ regular rhythms rather
than rapidly respond to market changes. Specifically, I investigate how competing in

9

diverse markets may influence digital startups’ adherence to rhythmic design iterations.
This is important because market diversification is not uncommon for digital startups,
given their convenient access to multiple markets through digital affordances, e.g., iOS
app store (Shaheer & Li, 2020; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 2008). I propose that two types of
market diversification, platform diversification and international diversification, affect
digital startups’ adherence to design iteration rhythms. I argue that these types of market
diversification exert opposing influences on design iteration rhythms, given the distinct
challenges in these diverse markets.
Based on the parametric event history analysis of a sample of 110 mobile game
startups, I find that digital startups tend to use rhythms for organizing design iterations.
The basic argument is that rhythms help reduce coordination costs when firms are
frequently engaged in design iteration. Moreover, international diversification hinders
design iteration rhythms while platform diversification facilitates the use of rhythms.
Since the opportunity landscapes are heterogeneous across countries, firms must be
responsive when arranging design iterations and bear the incurred coordination costs. It
suggests that digital startups configure design iteration rhythms to align with the
diversification strategies. This study contributes to current understanding of how firms
strategize entrepreneurial actions to simultaneously capture opportunities across different
contexts.
The three essays altogether contribute to the strategic logic of opportunity. First,
my focus on digital firms’ innovation and learning activities calls for a new strategic
logic that emphasizes opportunities. Extant strategy research has significantly advanced
our understanding of the strategic logics firms use to compete and innovate (i.e., positions,
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resources). Yet, traditional strategic logics encounter limitations explaining how digital
unicorns soared in the past decade (e.g., Facebook, ByteDance) (Bingham & Eisenhardt,
2008). Likewise, many of these digital firms I study in this dissertation do not start with
unique assets like advanced technologies or differentiated product/service positionings.
Instead, they are known for probing flows of attractive opportunities earlier than their
competitors and are capable of continuously innovating new products/services to capture
these fleeting opportunities better than others. Entrepreneurial actions that concern the
sensing and seizing of opportunities, like iterations, are central to explaining why these
firms probe and capture opportunities better than others.
Second, iteration-related activities (e.g., design iteration) play a central role in
explaining how firms employ opportunity logic in the digital marketplace. The “highvelocity” (i.e., ambiguous, unpredictable, and fast-pace) of digital marketplaces limits
planning and so favors entrepreneurial actions and adaptation (Eisenhardt & Bingham,
2017). Specifically, I investigate how firms use design iteration to sense and seize
opportunities and even transform them through continued renewal. My first essay
explores how mobile game publishers seize opportunities by updating game designs to
cater to the evolving needs of gamers. I find out that, despite the well-recognized positive
aspects of iteration, seizing opportunities through iteration could be risky as it disrupts
the ingrained habits of its consumers. My second essay sheds light on how app updates
enable firms to better sense the emerging innovation opportunities under high
institutional uncertainty. The trial-and-error nature of design iteration, thus, helps firms
scan the market and learn about new changes in the market. The third essay goes beyond
the direct implications of iteration and turns to understand what drives digital firms to
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continuously iterate. I find that continuous iterations are regulated by well-orchestrated
iteration rhythms to transform flows of opportunities. The three essays altogether strive to
depict a picture of how firms capture opportunities by managing design iteration.
Third, the role of timing is critical but severely understudied to explore firms’ use
of opportunity logic. My exploration of publishers’ complex character of app updates
reveals the distinct aspects of iteration strategies as they unfold and inter-relate over time.
It points to the importance of understanding how digital firms strategize the timing of
iteration over time. Notably, process-oriented studies, which center on the temporal flow
of phenomena (Langley, 1999), have shed light on the role of timing for recurring
activities. For instance, Bingham, Heimeriks, Schijven, and Gates (2015) found a
backward sequence of learning to be the most effective in capturing opportunities. My
second essay indicates that frequent iterations over time enable firms to better probe into
the opportunities. Moreover, it is suggested that the temporal patterns of actions are
critical to understand how entrepreneurs enact and capture opportunities. Recent
development of entrepreneurship research has illustrated that opportunities require an
iterative process of action and reaction to be enacted (Alvarez and Barney, 2007:15).
Entrepreneurs engage the opportunities by entraining the timing of important
stakeholders together (e.g., venture capitals, customers, employees). If rhythms are not
well aligned among stakeholders, opportunity enactment cannot continue (Wood &
McKinley, 2017). In my third essay, I find that a time-paced rhythm is conducive to
organize internal employees to synchronize iteration-related activities. Therefore, how
firms strategize the temporal patterns of iteration is vital to understand firms’ opportunity
logic.
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While focusing on the strategic logic of opportunity, my dissertation takes an
initial but important step toward extending international business research in this
dynamic and fast-changing setting. As opportunity logic is quickly emerging in the
strategy and entrepreneurship fields, it is important for us to understand how international
business theoretical frameworks can contribute to this important venue. Opportunity logic
exhibits significant affinity to integrate with international business wisdom.
Environmental dynamism is argued to be a highly relevant condition determining the
extent to which opportunity logic works from its own definition (Schilke, Hu, & Helfat,
2018). The role of context, which is central to international business scholarship, has also
been recognized as the most frequently studied boundary condition in opportunity logic
(Barreto, 2010). However, most of these studies ignore the significant variation across
country contexts. Cross-country differences in terms of institutional underpinnings could
shape the opportunity landscape in different ways, providing a unique perspective to
explain how institutional environment contextualizes firms’ use of opportunity logic.
Given the importance of the integration between traditional strategic logics and
the institutional perspective (Peng et al., 2008), I see it as an important initiative to
channel this emerging strategic logic with the wisdom of institutional theorists. I
recognize that various institutional contexts may shape opportunity landscapes in
different ways (North, 1990), requiring firms to strategize differently to capture
opportunities. Specifically, my second essay examines how mobile app publishers should
contextualize the frequency of app updates to pursue innovation opportunities under
different levels of institutional uncertainty, while the third essay explores how digital
startups orchestrate rhythms of updates when competing simultaneously across many
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different country markets. I find that firms should frequently iterate product designs when
they are embedded in a country with high institutional uncertainty, and should employ a
flexible iteration rhythm when faced with multiple different country markets.
I also acknowledge that my theorization in this study has important limitations in
terms of generalizability. An assumption of a high-velocity market, such as nascent
industries, underlies the use of opportunity logic (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2008).
Attractive flows of opportunities may result in superior performance in this context
because valuable resources and differential positions are short-lived and can be quickly
rendered obsolete. Thus, my theoretical arguments can be well applied to industrial
environments that are characterized by unpredictable and rapid changes. In relatively
stable markets, iteration may still enable firms to learn but should be considered less
effective. Moreover, my focus on the digital sector assumes a highly flexible and agile
product development process, which greatly enhances firms' capability to capture fleeting
opportunities. In nascent industries where product development takes much longer (e.g.,
biotech), the emerged opportunities are difficult to be probed and captured before they
become outdated. Nevertheless, with the strong momentum of digitalization, I expect that
the product development processes would be transformed in many industries, enabling
more firms to capture opportunities rapidly. In sum, this dissertation goes beyond digital
and high-tech industries and sheds light on how firms deal with the turbulent and
uncertain settings in different countries with opportunity logic.
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CHAPTER 1
GROWING PAINS: THE HIDDEN DARK SIDE OF DESIGN
ITERATION ON MOBILE GAMES PERFORMANCE

Abstract: Strategy research advises firms to capture generative value by continually
introducing generational improvements on their existing products. This paper considers a
potential dark side of such strategy. I argue that design iteration may elicit a negative
response from consumers, as it distorts their ingrained behavioral patterns and imposes
learning costs. Further, I propose that this negative effect of design iteration will diminish
when the product has a leading market position; it will be more severe as the product
undergoes more iterations; and it will be attenuated when the platform the product is
affiliated with has experienced a recent design iteration. Using a difference-in-differences
design based on mobile game apps that multihome on two platforms, I find supportive
evidence for my hypotheses and discuss implications for strategy and technology
innovation literature.

Keywords: innovation strategy, generative appropriability, design iteration, demand-side
perspective, difference-in-differences design
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INTRODUCTION
A central topic in strategy research concerns how firms can appropriate value from their
own innovations (Teece, 1986). Recently, scholars have drawn attention to the idea of
generative appropriability as an important second-order form of value appropriation,
which reflects the effectiveness in capturing value through future innovations that are
spawned by the current one (Ahuja, Lampert, & Novelli, 2013). A firm can appropriate
generative value by continually introducing improved generations of its original
innovation, before others develop substitutes based on that innovation. This is a
particularly prominent practice in technology industries where existing product
innovations are frequently supplanted by subsequent generations of products (Helfat &
Raubitschek, 2000), and in the context of digital platforms where firms rely on
generational innovation as a dominant appropriability strategy that preempts competitive
imitation (Miric, Boudreau, & Jeppesen, 2019). It has been argued that these generational
innovations account for the vast majority of economic value created by innovating firms
(Pisano, 2015). Yet few studies have empirically investigated their performance
implications.
This inadequacy of evidence is troubling given the normative emphasis on
generational innovation as an appropriability strategy that enables firms to sustain
advantages. Scholars have indeed noted that innovations that enhance firms’
competencies may unwittingly destroy consumer value (Afuah, 2000). By extension,
those introducing generational innovations to enhance generative appropriability could
run the risk of consumer backlash against unwelcome product upgrades. This echoes the
fact that firms commonly face high failure rates with their innovations (Moore, 1991).
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Consider a recent major app redesign by Snapchat that caused widespread anger among
users. The leading social networking app lost three million daily active users in the
second quarter of 2018, for which CEO Evan Spiegel blamed the product redesign (New
York Times, 2018). Likewise, the first generational upgrade of the hit game Pokémon
GO sparked a significant outcry on social media (CNBC, 2016). These arguments and
observations from practice suggest considerable heterogeneity in the performance
outcomes of generational innovation, and underscore the need for further investigation
given the corresponding implications for firms’ competitiveness.
In addressing this gap, I focus on design iteration, through which firms test and
tune product designs based on market feedback (Chen, Wang, Cui, & Li, 2020). In line
with the arguments for generative appropriability, extant literature tends to emphasize the
benefits of design iteration for the firm, as introducing design iterations can help
incumbents survive industry evolution and maximize returns from their initial
investments in innovation (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Miric & Jeppesen, 2020). Yet the
literature has provided surprisingly little evidence as to how this pursuit of generative
appropriability may affect product performance.
I draw on the demand-side perspective to examine consumers’ product adoption
following design iteration (Adner & Levinthal, 2001; Priem, 2007; Wang, Aggarwal, &
Wu, 2020). Because design iteration brings changes to existing products that are already
embedded in consumers’ behavioral patterns, I argue that they are likely to cause frictions
by altering ingrained habits and increasing learning costs for consumers. As a result, I
expect that consumers will be more likely to resist design iteration, rather than engage in
behavioral adjustment, particularly in the short-term. Further, I posit that the negative
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effect of design iteration will vary depending on the relative benefits of adoption for
consumers vis-à-vis their behavioral adjustment required. I argue that the negative effect
will diminish when the product has a leading market position; it will be more severe as
the product undergoes more design iterations; and it will be attenuated when the platform
the product is affiliated with has experienced a recent design iteration.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the short-term ramifications of design iteration.
My assumption is that the functional advantages offered by design iteration may
themselves be short-lived because of abrupt obsolescence in wake of constant market and
technological changes (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Tripsas, 1997). This dynamism is, in
fact, the very reason for the ongoing release of design iterations in a bid to create longlasting appeal for the product (Lawless & Anderson, 1996), as the accumulation of shortterm advances can have profound implications for the firm’s long-term success (Helfat &
Winter, 2011). Moreover, I recognize that design iteration is a deliberate choice made by
firms. For example, seasonal holidays may breed a spike in product demand, and in
response, firms are likely to introduce design iterations in advance. To address the
corresponding endogeneity issue, my analysis utilizes a unique matched difference-indifferences research design using data from the mobile games industry. The identification
strategy leverages asynchronous design iterations of multihoming mobile games (i.e.,
game apps available on more than one platform). By comparing the change in daily
active users of the upgraded apps (i.e. treatment group) vis-à-vis the same apps that have
yet to be upgraded on the rival platform (i.e. control group), I can minimize unobserved
heterogeneity (e.g., developer traits, app characteristics, time effects, etc.). I find
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evidence in support of my hypotheses, based on 1,610 design iteration events in
worldwide markets.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Generative appropriability and design iteration
Strategy research has largely focused on first-order appropriability, which refers to a
firm's effectiveness in exploiting a given innovation by translating it into financial returns
(James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013). Studies of such appropriability seek to identify, among the
various possible business models, the best approach to monetizing a firm’s existing
innovation (Teece, 1986). Far less attention has been paid to generative appropriability as
an important second-order element of appropriability, which concerns the firm’s
effectiveness in capturing the greatest share of future innovations that are spawned from
its origianl innovation (Ahuja et al., 2013; Alnuaimi & George, 2016).
To further understand generative appropriability, I build on previous research on
design iteration through which firms test and tune product designs within a technological
regime (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995; Chen et al., 2020; Turner, Mitchell, & Bettis, 2010).
A technological regime, or trajectory, is a commonly-accepted set of technical principles
for generating solutions to particular technological problems (Cohen, 2010; Nelson &
Winter, 1977). Within a regime, technological development proceeds along a relatively
clear path drawing on familiar methods of solution. As illustrative examples, the
transition in operating systems to Windows 10 from its predecessor (Windows 8) would
be within a technological regime, and therefore a design iteration; by contrast, a shift
from Windows to Linux represents a change of technological regime and thus would not
be considered a design iteration. Other examples are widely seen in automotive and
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consumer electronics industries where model upgrades are introduced regularly. Recently
design iterations have become particularly prevalent in the digital economy, as the
flexible nature of software-based products allows for continual improvements over the
product lifecycle (Lobel et al., 2016; MacCormack, Verganti, & Iansiti, 2001; Tschang,
2007).
In previous work, researchers have attempted to understand whether and under
what conditions firms introduce design iteration. The release of design iteration tends to
exhibit a consistent temporal pattern given the critical role of routines in developing and
introducing products (Turner et al., 2013). Not only is design iteration driven by a firm’s
own innovation strategy featuring temporal consistency, it also can be a response to
external events such as competitors’ innovations (Turner et al., 2010). From the view of
performance implications of design iteration, existing studies have emphasized its
benefits for firms. Design iterations can help them respond to consumers’ changing tastes
and maximize returns from firms’ initial investments in innovation (Ansari, Garud, &
Kumaraswamy, 2016; Lawless & Anderson, 1996). That design iteration can improve
firms’ competitiveness during technology evolution seems taken for granted. Yet how
design iteration affects consumer utility and product performance remains a black box.
Demand-side perspective on technology innovation
A parallel line of research in the technology innovation literature is the demand-side
perspective, which concerns consumers’ evaluation of products’ functional performance
(Priem, Li, & Carr, 2012). While often implicit, the underlying premise revolves around
how consumers react to innovation. To date, demand-side studies in technology
innovation research have focused on customer-oriented innovation strategy for value
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creation (Danneels, 2003). As with innovation diffusion studies (Rogers, 2003), this work
largely follows a pro-change approach and typically presumes that technology
innovations bringing novel solutions and improvements over existing alternatives tend to
ultimately be adopted by consumers (Garcia, Bardhi, and Friedrich, 2007). Researchers
thus are more concerned with antecedents to the diffusion of an innovation rather than
focusing on factors that inhibit its diffusion.
This is not without exceptions. Adner and Snow (2010) show that some consumer
segments for an existing product may perceive little utility from the new features
associated with a technological transition. Mainstream consumers are often found to be
reluctant to adopt new products based on disruptive technologies because the attribute set
being offered is misaligned with their functional preferences (Christensen, 1992;
Christensen & Bower, 1996). More importantly, studies of technological changes have
investigated how and why they may harm incumbent firms’ customers (Afuah & Bahram,
1995). Using the case of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985), Afuah (2000) illustrates
the possibility that innovations that enhance incumbents’ competencies may unwittingly
render obsolete consumers’ accumulated skills and knowledge and thus destroy consumer
value. Overall, though, scant attention has been paid to the changes that innovations may
impose on consumers and the fact that consumers may have natural resistance to such
changes (Heidenreich & Handrich, 2015; Oreg, 2003).
Furthermore, extant work on technology innovation is based on the assumption
that consumer utility derived from a product innovation corresponds to the level of
performance improvements it offers (Adner, 2002). Building on a firm’s existing product,
design iterations commonly improve on the product attributes or the relationships among
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these attributes (Moreau, Lehmann, & Markman, 2001). This has directed much attention
to the benefits of design iteration as an incremental approach for advancing along an
existing technological trajectory, but not as a source of disruption. This research omission
may be due to a potential conflation between incremental innovation and design iteration.
While both utilize established technical principles, extend design on existing products
and fit with the firm’s current customer base (Henderson & Clark, 1990), design iteration
is distinct as it incurs substantial changes to consumers by altering an existing product or
transforming its scope (Turner et al., 2010). The potential negative consequences may
only occur when changes involve new functionality and significant shift of existing
functionality and design. Nonetheless, because of its evolutionary nature, design iteration
is subsumed under the broader literature on incremental innovation, without due
consideration of the disturbances it might cause (Moreau et al., 2001).
The dark side of design iteration
Following the demand-side perspective, I attribute consumers’ adoption of a design
iteration to their evaluation of the upgraded product. By definition, design iteration
provides additional functional attributes for consumers, which can add to consumer utility
and generate additional demand and sales (Banbury & Mitchell, 1995). However, the
improvement on some performance dimensions may be accompanied by the loss of
benefits on others, and as a result, the net utility change created by functional extensions
should not be assumed (Mukherjee & Hoyer, 2001).
We argue that for many consumers the original product is already embedded in
their existing patterns of behavior. Scholars in psychology show that individuals develop
habits to engage in particular patterns of behavior in response to stable contextual cues,
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based on their performing activities repeatedly in similar contexts (Ouellette & Wood,
1998; Wood & Neal, 2007). As individuals often seek such stability and consistency,
changes that distort habits can be disturbing (Oreg, 2003). For example, researchers find
that information technology users do not willingly embrace change, but prefer
innovations that cause no change to the status quo (Rivard and Lapointe, 2012). Design
iterations which unsettle ingrained consumption habits may elicit a negative evaluative
response from consumers because changes inhibiting habitual responses demand
additional cognitive resources (Quinn et al., 2010) and consumers will be forced to
undergo a prolonged process of behavioral adjustment before they can reach the same
level of comfort as with the past product generation (Chen and Hitt, 2002; Ram, 1989).
Furthermore, I argue that while design iteration is intended to capture generative
value by introducing innovative features to the market, they also impose learning costs
upon consumers which can be value destroying. Design iteration confronts consumers
with costs for accepting new contents, for which some accumulated knowledge may
become less efficacious and new skills must be learned (Afuah, 2000). Learning costs
involve cognitive efforts on how to operate the new product and benefit from the
technical advances (Garcia et al., 2007; Mukherjee and Hoyer, 2001).
Meanwhile, it is unreasonable to assume that consumers can fully exploit the
functional benefits in the short term. Distracted by the short-term inconvenience,
consumers may be resistant to a new feature regardless of the substance of its benefits
(Hong et al., 2011). The reluctance for altering established behaviors and skills prompts
consumers to refrain from investing in learning, even if they may subscribe to the change
in principle over the long term. For average consumers, the perceived cost of enduring
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the adjustment period may outweigh the potential benefits to be extracted in the long term,
such that consumers may view design iteration more as an immediate disruption.
Commenting on the recent design iteration, a Snapchat spokesperson admitted that
“updates as big as this one can take a little getting used to…but I hope the community
will enjoy it once they settle in” (CNN, 2018). Yet millions of once active users opened
the app less frequently as a result of the significant redesign.
Hence I posit that the introduction of a design iteration will reduce overall market
demand for and adoption of the product. This is because the disturbances consumers
perceive and the learning costs they assume exert a negative impact on product
evaluation.
H1: The introduction of a design iteration reduces consumers’ adoption of the product.
Moderation of relative benefits
Critical in demand-side understanding of innovation success is a focus on the varying
extent to which consumers value technology-driven performance improvements (Adner
and Levinthal, 2001; Aggarwal and Wu, 2015; Wang et al., 2020). As argued, this may
be based on inferences about the benefits afforded by a design iteration relative to its
potential negative effects, i.e., disturbances to consumers’ established behavior. The
relative (net) benefits that consumers expect to extract determine their overall evaluation
of the new product generation and hence how consumers will respond to the release of a
design iteration. Prior research suggests that a firm’s market position, experience with
prior innovations, and changes in foundational technology can shape its tendency to
engage in innovation (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008; Beck, Brüderl, and Woywode,
2008; Klevorick et al., 1995). Yet little evidence has been gathered on innovation
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outcomes. Extending the studies of innovation behavior, I propose that market position,
prior iterations, and platform iteration can influence innovation outcomes on the demand
side. These factors, which capture salient market and technology dimensions, do so by
shifting the potential benefits and costs associated with a design iteration, thereby
moderating the observed effect.
Market position
As a product attains a market-leading position, I expect the negative effect of design
iteration on consumer adoption to weaken for two reasons. First, the benefits of adoption
are likely to be amplified. Due to limited information processing capacity, consumers
tend to rely on external signals such as rankings in adoption decisions (Rietveld and
Eggers, 2018). It is reasonable to assume that the functional attributes of leading products
have been configured in a way that addresses the needs of the broader base of customers
(Slater and Mohr, 2006). Thus, embracing market-leading products helps to minimize
search efforts, as well as the ex post uncertainty associated with design iterations.
Furthermore, consumers’ evaluation metrics may evolve as the product becomes
increasingly successful and popular. Instead of basing product evaluation on tradeoffs
between certain functional attributes, consumers may converge toward a preoccupation to
satisfy social needs, i.e. “to get into the ‘swim of things’” and “to be fashionable or
stylish” (Leibenstein, 1950: 189). From this perspective, ceasing to use the renewed
product or seeking alternatives will force consumers to forego the enjoyment arising from
the related social interactions. Therefore, the benefits of adopting the latest product
design are higher for market-leading products than the others, all else equal.
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Second, I expect the behavioral costs of design iteration for consumers to be
smaller for products that are ranked high in the market. Consumers acquire knowledge
about a product via social learning, and such social learning occurs commonly in
consumer communities, including various online ones (Fisher, 2019). Research shows
that the extent to which consumers can attain information-based learning depends on the
size of the community (Hu, Yang, and Xu, 2019). For market-leading products,
consumers will have a greater social community to learn from, instead of having to learn
how to adapt to a new product design on their own. Networks of friends and strangers
offer knowledge about the new tools, techniques, tips and tricks. Such knowledge can
reduce the barrier to acquiring new skills specific to the iteration, and enable consumers
to benefit from technical advances without engaging in extensive learning. Given the
increased benefits and reduced behavioral costs consumers face, products’ market
position will weaken the negative effect of design iteration.
H2: The decrease in consumer adoption of the product in response to a design iteration
will be weaker when the product has attained a market-leading position.
Prior iterations
As the number of prior iterations increases, I expect the negative effect of design iteration
to be magnified for two reasons. First, more design iterations introduced for a given
product will lead to a longer technological legacy. As this legacy lengthens, updates in
functionality may complicate the interface, require additional resources, and may lead to
integration breakdown (Hann, Koh, and Niculescu, 2016), such that users face more
hurdles and impediments in extracting the benefits associated with the design iteration.
For example, Minecraft players constantly complain that functional changes in new
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updates are not compatible with game mechanics in an older version and they must fix
damages on the resources they have built before utilizing the latest improvements
(Thompson, 2016). Delays may arise for consumers as a result of efforts to ensure that
the new product features and functional advances sync with a growing number of early
iterations. Thus, I expect consumers to be less motivated to change their existing patterns
of behaviour, as they perceive fewer benefits in the latest product design.
Second, consumers who have stayed with the product through many iterations are
likely to have developed consistent behavioral patterns and become increasingly reluctant
to experience the learning and behavioral costs. Frequent design iterations not only have
imposed extra burden on consumers’ capacity for behavioral adjustment, but any
additional change may also increase the risk of disrupting ingrained consumption habits.
While it may be the case that consumers have shown that they are willing to experience
these costs in the past, psychologists have argued that disrupting a habit is a taxing
process that requires and drains resources like willpower and self-control (Neal, Wood,
and Drolet, 2013; Quinn et al., 2010). In relative terms, that increases the perceived
learning costs and behavioral adjustments involved with a new design iteration. The more
that consumers have experienced prior design iterations (i.e., disrupted their habits), the
less energy, resources and even interest they may have to adopt again. Overall, I posit
that the negative effect of design iteration is amplified when the product has experienced
more iterations.
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H3: The decrease in consumer adoption of the product in response to a design iteration
will be greater when the product has experienced more iterations.
Platform iteration
When the platform the product is affiliated with experiences a recent iteration, I expect
the negative effect of the product’s design iteration to be attenuated for two reasons. First,
consumers will expect to realize additional functional benefits given the platform’s
iteration. In the digital economy, platform-based products are viewed as complementary
to and interdependent on the platform technology (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013). For
instance, in mobile computing industries, what consumers can expect to achieve with
mobile apps depends on the operating system (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 2014). When
there is design iteration at the platform level, it shines a light (focuses attention) on the
foundational technology and related industries (similar to the way the computing industry
used to be top of mind for consumers and producers during the COMDEX trade show).
As such, one would expect consumers to allocate more time and attention to the platform
technology and complementary products in general. That may elicit positive perception
of the short-term benefits associated with the functional improvements introduced by
complementary products. Hence, consumers will be better prepared to explore the
product’s design iteration and extract functional benefits.
Second, when there is design iteration at the platform level, that change in the
technological environment should reduce the disruptive effect of design iteration on
consumers. Psychologists show that as individuals perform activities repeatedly in similar
contexts, they develop stronger associations between the stable features of the context
and how they perform the activity (Aarts, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg, 1998;
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Ouellette and Wood, 1998). When there is a shift in the context, such associations tend to
weaken, and habits are less likely to drive individuals’ behavior to the same extent
(Wood, Tam, and Witt, 2005). Platform iteration represents an upstream intervention
leading to a shift in the technological environment (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017;
Kretschmer and Claussen, 2016). In the altered environment where platform iteration
causes widespread changes across complementary products, the stimuli that trigger the
consumers’ habitual behaviors are less likely to be present. And even if the same stimuli
are present, when the environment is altered, consumers will be less likely to be as reliant
on their formed habits and expectations. This is especially true when the environmental
change can be predicted or communicated to consumers (Verplanken and Wood, 2006),
in much the same way as how platform iteration works in the digital economy. Hence, the
disruption on habitual behaviors will be overshadowed when there is a shift in the
surrounding context. Given increased benefits afforded by a new platform iteration and
reduced disruptions to consumers’ behavioral patterns, platform iteration will render the
negative effect of design iteration weaker.
H4: The decrease in consumer adoption of the product in response to a design iteration
will be weaker when the platform the product is affiliated with has experienced a recent
iteration.
DATA AND METHODS
Research context and data
In this study, I examine how design iteration affects near-term demand, specifically
consumer adoption, in the context of the mobile app industry. This industry provides an
apt empirical setting in which to investigate the interplay between design iteration and
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demand side responses. Games are the largest category in the mobile app industry, both
in terms of share of the total number of mobile apps (e.g., 24.9% in iOS) and revenues
(e.g., in terms of revenue, seven of the top 10 apps subcategories are part of the games
category). In addition, a significant group of mobile game users spend tremendous
amounts of time and money to explore the gameplay and improve their skills. Such
investment is game-specific, and the knowledge and credits do not transfer across games.
This makes gamers relatively reluctant to switch games, so that the user disruption I seek
to capture is not a mundane activity. More importantly, these gamers are the primary
source of revenues for mobile game developers. Thus, any disruption based on existing
users is a critical concern for mobile game developers.
A scope condition of my theory is that the design iteration is a ubiquitous and
important tool in firms’ arsenal. This is clearly the case for mobile games. I find that the
update rate of game apps is among the highest in the apps industry. To gain greater
insights into the context, I conducted interviews with several developers of game apps.
One described the importance of updates as follows: “Update is a question of life or death
for a mobile game, because users would get bored playing the same game within a month.
The best way to survive is to update new content regularly.” Another developer
highlighted that, “among different types of updates, those major updates are the most
important, as they include substantial changes to the original design, expend most firm
resources, and have the highest potential to generate revenues.” Thus, the mobile game
category provides an ideal context to study the performance implications of the design
iteration.
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Our study focuses on design iteration, i.e., significant technical advances/change
relative to the existing product, and I exclude minor and “bugfix” updates. Although
technical performance may improve as a result of any update, prior work suggests that
the significance of the advance is limited, and primarily corrective, in the case of minor
and bugfix releases. To distinguish design iteration from other innovation updates, I
leverage a common practice for naming the updated version of games in the mobile game
industry. According to this practice, version numbers are based on three digits (i.e.,
Version 1.2.0, 3.7.2). When releasing a new version, there will be an increment in the
first-digit if significant changes are involved in the form of new contents, new functions
and features, new game designs, and new game play modes; an increment in the seconddigit denotes minor improvements on existing features/functions, and an increment in the
third-digit suggests involves bugfixes or marginal changes. In other words, an increment
in the first-digit represents a substantial technical advance relative to the existing product
design. It represents functional advances along the same technological trajectory, yet
much more substantial advances than second-digit changes. I discussed the concept and
measurement of design iteration with mobile game developers and product managers who
are in charge of game updates, or LiveOps in their jargon. They confirmed that
operationalizing design iteration as an increase in the first digit is an appropriate way to
distinguish from minor, maintenance-oriented updates.1 Doing so allows us to capture
design iteration in much the same way as I and other scholars have operationalized it.

1

During the interviews, practitioners suggest that there is a small portion of mobile

games that do not ever change the first digit of their game version names, despite that
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To test my hypotheses about the effects of design iteration on consumers’
adoption of the product, I acquired data from a leading analyst firm in the mobile
intelligence sector. The analyst firm tracks and archives information related to all mobile
apps developed for the iOS platform. Its data are extensively used by app developers,
venture capital firms, and financial analysts. The data set comprises detailed mobile apps
information for the period from Jan 1st 2015 to Dec 31th 2017 across the 58 major country
markets on both iOS and Google play app stores that were available from the analyst firm.
I obtained information on app updates, adoption and basic app characteristics from the
analyst firm. While the intelligence firm is widely viewed as a legitimate source of
industry data/information, as a further check on the validity of the data, I verified that
rankings and ratings of the top 20 apps in my acquired data matched corresponding
information from two other providers of mobile apps data (most mobile app data
providers offer free access to select information on recent top ranked apps).
Matching and difference-in-differences approach
Given that the timing of generational innovation might be strategic and therefore
endogenous, I apply difference-in-differences approaches to overcome biases related to
potential time trends (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). To construct treatment
and control groups in difference-in-differences design, a common approach is to use
propensity score matching, which matches the samples by trajectories of the dependent
variable before the occurrence of the event (Kovács & Sharkey, 2014). However, this
approach can still be subject to severe problems with unobservable variables (e.g., app
some of the updates they release are deemed rather major ones. To this end, I consider
my measurement of design iteration to be conservative.
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theme, firm strategy, managerial composition) due to the limited availability of variables.
Unobserved firm and product level characteristics may contribute to the divergence of
trajectories after the design iteration. In other words, the design iteration decision could
still be confounded by unobserved variables. Ideally, the empirical concern would be
minimized if I could compare the demand of two identical apps (i.e., “twins”) produced
by the same firm observed at the same time with only one experiencing treatment (i.e.,
experiencing generational product innovation). In fact, in the mobile app context, multihoming/cross-platform apps can provide a “quasi” experiment context to allow for
comparisons between “twins”. To a large extent, the same app on different platforms
share identical characteristics at both the firm and product level. If I control for the
platform effect and some factors at the app-platform level (e.g., ranking), the decision to
first update the app on one platform would be close to a random treatment. Therefore, I
paired twin-apps from different platforms together so that I could address the prevailing
endogeneity concerns in the examination of design iteration outcomes (Tiwana, 2015).
Following prior literature using mobile apps datasets (Ghose and Han, 2014;
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), I employed a “top segmentation” approach. The distribution
of app revenues and downloads is heavily skewed and exhibits a long-tail shape. Based
on a joint report by Prior Data and Pollen VC, more than half (55%) of the app store
revenue in 2015 was generated by the top 100 apps, with the rest taken up by the other
1,500,000 apps (Macmillan, 2015). Further, when consumers are browsing apps by
category, the Apple App Store only shows top apps on its page—searching by keywords
is required to reach the rest—creating a huge difference in market exposure between top
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apps and others (Ghose and Han, 2014). Thus, top ranked apps represent a major part of
the apps industry.
To construct the sample, I started with a list of top ranked apps on iOS, then
found the identical twins for them on Android, and concluded by going through a series
of steps to identify suitable design iteration events for my study. Following Kapoor and
Agarwal (2017), I first selected top grossing apps that ranked in the top 500 in each
month from Jan 2015 to Dec 2017 in 58 countries in the iOS game category, generating a
sample with 7,398 apps. To construct matched pairs for DID analysis, I searched for the
counterparts of these iOS game apps on the Android platform from the same data source,
and I found 3,187 of them that have released equivalent apps in the Android platform.
That provided us with 3,187 pairs of cross-platform mobile game apps (released on both
Android and iOS platforms).
To ensure that the same apps on different platforms share very similar product
characteristics, I screened all 3,187 pairs of apps in the sample to identify the focal design
iteration events. First, I identified paired updates (design iteration, minor or bugfixes) that
share the same version names between the cross-platform apps (15,115 paired updates).
During my inspection of data and interviews with app developers, I found that the same
app on different platforms may still be somewhat different from each other in update
progress and product design. However, when version names (e.g., 3.4.2) for the same app
on different platforms are the same, the update progress and product characteristics are
most likely to be very similar. To ensure that the focal updates take place when both
treatment and control groups share very similar product characteristics, I start by focusing
on the paired updates that share the same version names on different platforms. Second, I
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dropped out those paired updates if one of them had experienced any type of updates
shortly after the matched updates (less than 7 days) the matched update, so as not to
confound the influence of paired updates with the focal update.2 That led to 2,032 paired
updates. Third, I kept the pairs if either one of them experienced the focal update, while
the other one was not updated for at least 7 days after the counterpart’s focal update. To
isolate the effect of the focal update, I also excluded pairs that have experienced
additional updates right after the focal update within one week. In doing so, I generated a
7-day period after the focal update in which the counterpart app was yet to update,
leaving us with 1,706 paired updates. Finally, I kept the paired updates corresponding to
focal updates that are qualified as design iterations based on the criteria mentioned earlier.
These focal updates must have increments in the first-digit of their version names
compared to the version names of the paired updates. In summary, I had a final sample of
1,610 focal design iteration events occurring across apps and country markets. Figure 1.1
helps illustrate my sampling procedures. I treated the date of focal design iteration as day
0 and keep data that ranges from day -7 to day 7 for each selected pair. In this way, the
matched samples are equivalent in unobserved covariates at the firm level, product level
and even product-day level unobserved covariates.
In econometrics terms, my regressions follow the difference-in-differences
approach. The identification of the treatment effect relies on comparing changes in
adoption over time between apps that experienced generational product innovations
during the observation window and the matched apps that are identical but operate on
different platforms and did not experience the design iteration event. In statistical

2

Most mobile game users update new versions within the first 4-5 days.
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modeling, I followed previous studies to conduct pooled regressions that include
matched-dyad fixed effects, or in other words, app fixed effects (Azoulay, Stuart, &
Wang, 2014; Kovács & Sharkey, 2014; Singh & Agrawal, 2011).
While cross-platform twins provide us with a unique context that matches exactly
for developer-level characteristics (size, age, experience, etc.) and app-level
characteristics (genre, contents, quality, etc.), they may exhibit different adoption
trajectories across time, mostly due to the platform effect (platform-specific regulations,
consumers’ preferences for app features, consumers’ willingness to pay, etc.). Therefore,
I must examine the “common trend assumption” (or sometimes known as parallel path
assumption) frequently required before running difference-in-differences (DID) tests.
Following the procedure of Asgari, Singh, and Mitchell (2017), I employed both
graphical and statistical assessments of the common trend assumption. I graphed the
values of the outcome variable across the treatment and control groups to compare the
average change trend before the event. Both treatment and control groups had very
similar trends of daily active users prior to the design iteration event at day 8. Further, the
number of daily active users for the treatment group (experiencing design iteration at day
8) does not increase as fast as the control group after the design iteration. I also
conducted Stata procedure “didq” to assess the plots statistically (Mora and Reggio,
2015). The results indicate that the null hypotheses of common trend cannot be rejected,
supporting the validity of the assumption.
Variables
Dependent variable. To capture the instant change in near-term demand around design
iteration, I measured consumer adoption of a mobile game by the number of consumers
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that use the app on a specific day in the focal country market. In order to normalize its
distribution, I log-transformed the measure such that consumer adoption equals to ln
(number of daily active users + 1). By log-transforming the number of consumers, I
capture the within-app percent change in consumer adoption as a function of the design
iteration event and covariates (Greene, 2003; Wang et al., 2020). Similar measures of
count within a specific time interval (e.g., day, week, month) have been frequently
adopted to gauge consumers’ usage of online games, mobile apps, or social networking
services (Kovács & Sharkey, 2014; Tiwana, 2015; Toubia & Stephen, 2013).
Independent variables. Given that I seek to examine research questions with the
matched difference-in-differences design, I are interested in the significance level and
magnitude of the difference estimator (Bertrand et al., 2004). The difference estimator is
the interaction of the treatment and post dummy variables. The treatment variable is a
dummy variable, which is coded as 1 for the app-platform that experiences a design
iteration in the observation window and 0 for the control group. The post variable is also
a dummy variable, which receives a value of 1 from day 0 to day 7 and 0 from day -7 to
day -1. In essence, the difference estimator captures whether the dependent variable has
changed at a significantly different rate for the treated group as compared to the control
group.
Moderators. According to my theory development, the treatment effect of design
iteration would vary across samples based on the relative benefits consumers can extract
from design iterations. Therefore, I included market position, prior iterations, and
platform iteration as moderators to construct triple difference models. First, I expect that
market position on a platform will influence the negative effect of a design iteration event.
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While market share, market growth or other related variables are often employed to
characterize the market position in traditional industries (e.g., Hopkins, 1987), market
position in digital platforms is very straightforward. Mobile app ranking lists capture the
market positions of different apps based on their recent demand, rewarding popular apps
with salient market visibility and a trendy appeal (Ifrach and Johari, 2014). Since ranking
lists aggregate information about the usage decisions of all other app users, they reduce
the uncertainty consumers face regarding the value of apps they have not used. Given that
most ranking lists only show the top 30 ranked apps in a category list, I included an
indicator of market position for the focal app on the focal country-platform, coding as 1 if
the focal app has reached top 30 in the local market ranking, 0 otherwise. Second, prior
iterations may also moderate how the upcoming design iteration affect consumer
adoption. The number of prior iterations for the focal app captures its cumulative
innovation history and demand dynamics (Eggers & Rietveld, 2018). I used the number
of prior design iterations before the focal day (log-transformed) as the measure of prior
generations. Third, platform iteration represents upstream interventions leading to a shift
in the technological environment (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Kretschmer and Claussen,
2016). I measured platform iteration with a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the
platform has undergone a major update in the past month and 0 otherwise.
Controls. While matching “twin” apps together obviates the need for app and
developer level controls (Foerderer and Heinzl, 2017; Kovács and Sharkey, 2014), I must
take into account the idiosyncrasy between the “twin” apps due to platform difference. To
control for variation in the effect of the design iteration events across different platforms,
I included a dummy variable of platform, which is coded as 1 if the app is operating on
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iOS platform, 0 otherwise. Further, I also included competition to control for innovation
by competing apps across time (Turner et al., 2010). I used the number of major updates
in the same subcategory as the focal app to measure competition (log-transformed). In
addition, I included app age and time since the last update, and their square terms, to
account for the influence of app lifecycle and update recency. Specifically, I measured
app age as the log-transformed number of days since the first day of app release on the
platform, and I measured time since last update as the log-transformed number of days
since the date of the most recent update of the product on the same platform. Table 1.1
shows the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of the main variables.
Analysis
We conducted DID regressions to estimate the adoption difference between treatment and
control apps at the app-country-platform level, with app-country fixed effects and
platform fixed effects. Specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects difference-indifferences regression:
Yip = α + αi + αp + βTip + γtip + δ (Tip · tip) + εip
By inspecting the equation, I can see that the coefficients have the following
interpretation: α = constant term; αi = app-country fixed effects; αp = platform fixed
effects; β = treatment group specific effect (treatment/control); γ = time trend common to
control and treatment groups (pre/post-focal update); δ = true effect of treatment.
RESULTS
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics and the correlations between covariates. Table 1.2
presents the results examining Hypothesis 1 in Models 1-4, which suggest that design
iteration decreases consumers’ usage of the product. In Model 1, I only included only
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observations that are before design iteration events (day 1 to 7 in the 15-day observation
window), and I controlled for app, country and platform fixed effects separately. The
coefficient of treatment suggests that treatment group has 33.4% higher DAU than the
control group before design iteration. I interpret that there is a significant difference
between treated and control groups regarding usage level. Developers may prefer to
introduce a design iteration first on the platform with more active users. In Model 2, I
only included observations that are after design iteration events (day 8 to 15 in the 15-day
observation window). The coefficient of treatment suggests that the treatment group has
only 16.3% higher DAU than the control group after design iteration (day 8). Compared
with the coefficient in Model 1, the DAU gap between the treatment and control groups
significantly shrinks, which is consistent with my H1 prediction. In Model 3, I adopted
the classic difference-in-differences estimator to report results. The variable of interest is
treatment*post, as the coefficient of this interaction term indicates the treatment effect of
design iteration on the outcome variable. The coefficient of treatment*post suggests that
apps that just experienced a design iteration event have 9.2% less DAU than before the
design iteration event, relative to apps that do not experience design iteration events.3
This is consistent with the results in Models 1 and 2. In Model 4, I further controlled for
the app-country fixed effects, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of
3

I employ the semilog specification as discussed in Greene (2003) and Wang, Aggarwal,

& Wu (2020). When the dependent variable ln(y) is a natural log and the independent
variable x is left unlogged, the coefficient on the (unlogged) independent variable is
interpreted as semielasticity of that independent variable, which is the within-app percent
change in consumer adoption.
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consumers’ preference across different countries. The results remain consistent. Thus, my
results support Hypothesis 1.
Further, I examined under what conditions design iteration would be more/less
disruptive. We, therefore, employed a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
design. Table 1.3 investigated the moderating effects of market position (H2), prior
iterations (H3), and platform iteration (H4) respectively. I have predicted that the
negative effect of design iteration on consumer adoption would be mitigated by market
position and platform iteration and amplified by prior iterations. In Model 5, the
coefficient of treatment*post*market position is significant. Figure 1.2 provides graphical
illustration. For non-top 30 apps, consumer adoption decreases by 10.0% after a design
iteration update, as compared to the control group; for top 30 apps, consumer adoption
increases by 8.5% after a design iteration update, as compared to the control group. Thus,
consistent with Hypothesis 2, I found that the negative effect of design iteration is
mitigated by the market position of the game, suggesting that the benefits of design
iteration outweigh the potential costs for market-leading games.
Model 6 reports the coefficient of treatment*post*prior generations, and Figure
1.3 assists in interpretation. For apps with a relatively low level of prior design iterations
(mean – 1 SD), consumer adoption decreases by 3.5% after a design iteration, as
compared to the control group; for apps with a high level of prior design iterations (mean
+ 1 SD), consumer adoption decreases by 14.3% after a design iteration, as compared to
the control group. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 3, I find that the negative effect
of design iteration event is amplified by prior iterations.
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Model 7 reports the moderating effect of platform iteration, and Figure 1.4
facilitates the interpretation. For apps that did not experience platform iteration in the
previous month, consumer adoption decreases by 11.5% after a design iteration, as
compared to the control group; for apps that experienced platform iteration in the
previous month, consumer adoption increases by 11.4% after a design iteration, as
compared to the control group. Thus, the negative effect of design iteration event is
mitigated by platform iteration, confirming my Hypothesis 4. In the sample, the benefits
of design iteration turn out to outweigh the potential costs when the platform has recently
undergone a design iteration.
Robustness tests
We conducted a series of robustness tests using alternative samples, measures and
analysis techniques to verify the main findings. First, to assess whether my theoretical
arguments only apply to design iterations rather than other types of updates, I conducted
placebo tests based on minor updates and bugfixes. I constructed samples of minor
updates and bugfixes using the same sample selection criteria and then reexamined my
hypotheses. I found that minor updates or bugfixes do not exhibit significant, negative
effects on consumer adoption.4 The coefficients of treatment*post are positive, either
insignificant or significant. Therefore, the consumer disruption effect is only observed in
design iterations in the sample, providing empirical support for my theoretical focus on
4

Based on the update records, I excluded a small portion of mobile games that do not use

the three-digit naming approach in order to ensure that second-digit increment updates
are indeed minor updates. Detailed procedures to construct the sample of minor updates
are available upon request.
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design iterations. Second, to verify whether the negative effect of design iteration is truly
due to disruptions to existing consumers as theorized, I created an alternative dependent
variable that excludes those daily active users who have just downloaded the game. I did
so by taking the difference between DAU and downloads on the focal day (logtransformed). The results with the alternative dependent variable remain qualitatively the
same for all hypotheses. Third, fixed effects and random effects models are both widely
used in twin studies. While the fixed-effects model is often used in difference-indifferences “twin” design to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, twin
studies can also employ random-effects models (Carlin et al., 2005), which treat twin
effects as randomly selected from a normal distribution. Accordingly, I reexamined all
my hypotheses using random-effects models at the app-country level. The results remain
consistent with my main specification.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, I seek to investigate the performance outcome of design iteration. Extant
literature has examined extensively the implications of technology evolution for firm
competition (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and it has emphasized the value of frequent
iterations in sustaining competitive advantage during industry evolution (Banbury and
Mitchell, 1995; Lawless and Anderson, 1996). My study instead examines the effect of
design iteration on consumer adoption. This is a key dimension of innovation outcome
since the commercial success of any innovation ultimately depends on adoption. Using a
matched difference-in-differences design, I find that design iteration reduces adoption in
the near-term, in line with my argument that the introduced changes are likely to cause
disturbances by altering ingrained behavioral patterns and increasing learning costs for
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consumers. Furthermore, consistent with the idea that the dark side of design iteration is
conditioned by the relative benefits of adoption vis-à-vis the disruptions, I find that
market position and platform iteration dampen the negative effect, while prior iterations
amplify it.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, my analysis points to
the tension in pursuing generative appropriability. Researchers advise that firms create
new innovations that build on their own existing innovations (Ahuja et al., 2013). Studies
indeed highlight the benefits of design iterations for sustaining competitive advantage
during industry evolution (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Lawless and Anderson, 1996).
However, while developing improved products incorporating features that build on a
firm’s current innovation can enhance generative appropriability, an emphasis on this
form of continual reinventiveness and seeking out new adopters could also destroy value
for existing consumers and damage the firm’s primary appropriability, i.e. the
commercialization of the innovation. In fact, if one views innovation as a type of
organizational change, it seems fitting to describe it along content and process
dimensions (Barnett and Carroll, 1995). While innovation, viewed through the lens of
content, involves new products delivering improved technical performance and serves as
a source of competitive advantage for innovating firms, the very process behind the
creation of such content may incur significant disruptions to organizational routines
partly due to the structural adjustments in the firm’s relationships with co-opetitors
(Carroll and Teo, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1992). I resonate with the idea of disruptive
process effects within the organization, and I extend it to the demand side. Design
iteration is simultaneously a value-creating outcome and a value-destroying process to
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consumers. While the content effect of design iteration may lead to higher generative
appropriability for the firm, the process itself incurs significant short-term costs and may
prevent potential benefits from realization.
Utilizing a novel identification strategy, my analysis can minimize unobserved
heterogeneity associated with innovation behaviors and capture the causal effect of
design iteration. While the immediate negative impact may decline over time, the
accumulation of shocks could have profound implications for the firm’s competitiveness.
That is particularly notable for firms in dynamic environments (e.g., the digital economy)
where design iterations are ubiquitously used for competitive responses or to preempt
imitation (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018; Miric et al., 2019). One may view introducing
design iterations as related to innovation-based firm adaptation in changing environments,
yet extant research such as that based on NK models tends to assume a zero cost of
adaptation for analytical clarity (Levinthal, 1997). My findings imply that adaptation
incurs costs; put at a more abstract level, firms must first climb down the current local
peak in order to relocate to a higher peak. I show that adaptation can trigger selfdisruption in that it erodes the customer base of incumbents and creates room for rivals’
competitive attack. These ideas can play a role in understanding how successful firms
could possibly die out. On the other hand, the findings also reveal a unique challenge for
entrepreneurial firms seeking to emerge from the low end of the market and appropriate
generative value arising from their original innovation, given that they may find
themselves more vulnerable to consumer backlash than market-leading incumbents.
Second, I extend the literature on technology evolution. Prior research tends to
link disruption with discontinuous technological transition or novel business models
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(Henderson and Clark, 1990), not with design iteration. This is partly because the
perceived discontinuity is assumed to be low for design iterations, given no change of
technological regime. Moreover, research on technology evolution emphasizes that
incumbent firms and industry structures are primarily disrupted by new entrants bringing
about competence-destroying changes (Tushman and Anderson, 1986); yet it still begs
the question of how successful firms get to the point where their products no longer
appeal to consumers. I argue that, just as incumbents demonstrate inertia to technological
changes (Rosenbloom, 2000; Tushman and Anderson, 1986), consumers may be reluctant
to adopt design iteration because of the distortions on their ingrained behavioral patterns.
I also stress the possibility that innovations enhancing competence for incumbents may
unwittingly render obsolete their consumers’ accumulated skills and knowledge and
hence destroy consumer value (Afuah, 2000; David, 1985). My view echoes but extends
the idea that product failures arise from firms’ inability to effectively manage customer
relationships (Levinthal, 1991).
Lastly, I enrich the demand-side perspective on technology innovation. Since
innovation outcomes are closely related to consumers’ adoption decisions, extant
research examines extensively the role of the demand environment. That perspective may
be particularly relevant for design iteration with which firms can continually adjust to
changing demand conditions (Henderson, 1999; Lawless and Anderson, 1996). To date
demand-side research primarily focuses on preference heterogeneity in explicating why
certain technology innovations are adopted (Danneels, 2004). The less noted fact is that
the vast majority of new product ideas suffer commercial failure. One of the key reasons
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is the resistance from consumers (Claudy, Garcia, and O’Driscoll, 2015), which has been
documented in the information systems literature (Rivard and Lapointe, 2012).
Instilling a new dimension to the demand-side view, my study shows how and
why the demand environment may present an impediment to product innovations. That
impediment is attributed to the fact that consumers may be overwhelmed by the shortterm costs associated with behavioral adjustments and learning. This is similar to the
foundational idea in the disruptive innovation literature that a technological change is
often perceived as inferior to existing technologies by the mass of consumers (Danneels,
2004). Moreover, the demand-side perspective allows us to explore conditions under
which the design iteration effect varies, as consumers’ benefits of adoption may outweigh
costs and vice versa. By focusing on important market and technology factors, I predict
product demand as a function of the barriers that consumers face in utilizing the design
iteration. The findings also bring nuances to the platform literature which has generally
viewed platform iteration as a disruptive force for complementors (Kretschmer and
Claussen, 2016; Ozalp, Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018). Overall, my analysis departs from
the customary view of the diffusion of a fixed innovation, and instead it depicts
consumers’ changing tendency of adoption as the product’s features and functions
continually evolve through its lifecycle.
The findings and the inferences from this study are subject to a number of caveats
that offer opportunities for future research. First, my empirical analysis is based on a
single industry setting. Whether and to what extent the findings would be observed in
other empirical contexts remains to be seen. Second, even for multihoming apps, firms
might have preferences for one market than the other. For instance, marketing efforts to
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retain customers may be unevenly distributed across two platforms and potentially bias
the results. Lastly, I encourage future research to tease out the direct, longer-term
consequences of a design iteration while controlling for the unobserved changes in
complementary assets and other organizational activities (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000).
In summary, this study extends our understanding of technology evolution. It
brings theoretical nuance to research on design iteration through a demand-side lens, and
it enriches the view of disruption in the innovation literature. These insights shed new
light on the risks associated with product redesign, regardless of the innovation content.
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Table 1.1 Summary statistics and correlation

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Consumer adoption
Treatment
Post
Market position
Prior generations
Platform generational
transition
Competition
Platform
App age
Time since the last
update

Consumer adoption
Treatment
Post
Market position
Prior generations
Platform generational
transition
Competition
Platform
App age
Time since the last
update

Mean
6.621
0.527
0.533
0.069
1.153

S.D.
2.454
0.499
0.499
0.254
0.589

1
1.000
-0.015
0.009
0.441
0.255

2

3

4

1.000
0.000
-0.009
-0.043

1.000
0.019
0.000

1.000
0.220

0.096

0.294

-0.007

-0.035

-0.006

-0.089

1.686
0.472
6.648

0.652
0.499
0.520

0.120
-0.096
0.063

-0.017
0.112
-0.035

0.100
0.000
0.011

0.122
0.023
0.194

4.081

0.797

-0.205

0.151

0.104

-0.177

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
-0.066

1.000

0.061
-0.023
0.305

-0.173
-0.217
0.006

1.000
-0.448
-0.080

1.000
0.163

1.000

-0.113

0.017

0.088

-0.062

0.021
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1.000

Table 1.2 Influence of design iteration on consumer adoption

Treatment

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Pre-update

Post-update

All sample

All sample

0.288

0.151

0.264

0.268

(0.022)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.014)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

0.177

0.176

(0.021)

(0.014)

[0.000]

[0.000]

-0.097

-0.096

(0.026)

(0.018)

[0.000]

[0.000]

Post

Treatment*Post

Market position

Prior generations

Platform generational

0.727

0.555

0.619

0.365

(0.066)

(0.060)

(0.044)

(0.040)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

0.013

-0.216

-0.058

-0.060

(0.070)

(0.066)

(0.047)

(0.033)

[0.857]

[0.001]

[0.219]

[0.072]

0.124

0.200

0.170

0.166

(0.053)

(0.049)

(0.035)

(0.025)

[0.019]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

0.271

0.302

0.216

0.209

(0.027)

(0.030)

(0.018)

(0.013)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

-0.297

-0.323

-0.356

-0.366

(0.030)

(0.030)

(0.021)

(0.014)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

6.839

4.564

6.271

6.290

(0.638)

(0.642)

(0.447)

(0.321)

transition

Competition

iOS platform

App age
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[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

-0.566

-0.378

-0.507

-0.508

(0.047)

(0.047)

(0.033)

(0.024)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.000]

-1.074

-1.959

-0.391

-0.332

(0.269)

(0.376)

(0.171)

(0.119)

[0.000]

[0.000]

[0.022]

[0.005]

0.035

0.136

-0.040

-0.045

(0.035)

(0.045)

(0.023)

(0.016)

[0.326]

[0.002]

[0.074]

[0.004]

App FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Country FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

App-country FE

NO

NO

NO

YES

Observations

21399

24456

45855

45855

R2

0.688

0.698

0.691

0.855

App age2

Time since the last update

Time since the last update2

Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets. All tests are
two-tailed.
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Table 1.3 DDD-moderation effects on the relationship between design iteration and
consumer adoption

Treatment*Post

Treatment*Market position

Post*Market position

Treatment*Post*Market position

Treatment*Prior generations

Post*Prior generations

Treatment*Post*Prior generations

Treatment*Platform generational transition

Post* Platform generational transition

Treatment*Post* Platform generational
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(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.105

0.020

-0.122

-0.031

(0.019)

(0.039)

(0.019)

(0.040)

[0.000]

[0.619]

[0.000]

[0.436]

-0.434

-0.737

(0.057)

(0.059)

[0.000]

[0.000]

-0.151

-0.215

(0.052)

(0.054)

[0.004]

[0.000]

0.187

0.280

(0.072)

(0.074)

[0.009]

[0.000]
0.030

0.021

(0.024)

(0.025)

[0.216]

[0.403]

0.029

0.046

(0.022)

(0.022)

[0.178]

[0.041]

-0.100

-0.090

(0.030)

(0.031)

[0.001]

[0.004]
-1.322

-1.496

(0.058)

(0.060)

[0.000]

[0.000]

-0.141

-0.149

(0.042)

(0.042)

[0.001]

[0.000]

0.230

0.239

transition

Controls
App-country FE

(0.061)

(0.061)

[0.000]

[0.000]

Included Included Included

Included

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

45855

45855

45855

45855

R2

0.855

0.855

0.857

0.858

Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets. All tests are
two-tailed.
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Figure 1.1 DID sample matching
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7
6.75
6.5
6.25
6

Predicted value of consumer adoption

Pre-GPI

Post-GPI

Treatment group=0

Treatment groupt=1

*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect

7

7.25
6.75
6.5

Predicted value of consumer adoption

7.5

Low market position (not ranked in top 30)

Pre-GPI

Post-GPI

Treatment group=0

Treatment group=1

*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect

High market position (ranked top 30)
Figure 1.2 Moderation effect of market position
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7
6.75
6.5
6

6.25

Linear Prediction

Pre-GPI

Post-GPI

Treatment group=0

Treatment groupt=1

*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect

6.75
6.5
6

6.25

Predicted value of consumer adoption

7

Apps with low number of prior iterations, mean – 1s.d.

Pre-GPI

Post-GPI

Treatment group=0

Treatment group=1

*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect

Apps with high number of prior iterations, mean + 1s.d.
Figure 1.3 Moderation effect of prior iterations
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7
6.75
6.5
6.25

Predicted value of consumer adoption

6

Pre-GPI

Post-GPI

Treatment group=0

Treatment group=1

*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect

7
6

6.5
5.5

Predicted value of consumer adoption

7.5

Apps without experiencing platform iteration in the previous month

Pre-GPI

Post-GPI

Treatment group=0

Treatment group=1

*Note: the dashed line represents the counterfactual trend if design iteration has no effect

Apps experienced platform iteration in the previous month
Figure 1.4 Moderation effect of platform iteration
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CHAPTER 2
DESIGN ITERATION, INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY, AND
PRODUCT INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE GLOBAL MOBILE
APPLICATION INDUSTRY

Abstract: Focusing on nascent industries, this paper infuses opportunity logic with the
institutional perspective to address the questions, how various institutional contexts shape
firm innovation and how firms take iterative actions to navigate such institutional
contexts. I propose that there is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty
and digital product innovation, by considering both the challenges and opportunities
firms confront in nascent industries. Furthermore, I focus on firms’ iteration of product
design and argue that frequent iterations enable firms to better innovate under high
institutional uncertainty. Using 4,629 firms from 54 countries in the global mobile app
industry, my empirical results provide support for all hypotheses. I discuss implications
for opportunity logic, a dynamic view of institutions, and the digital innovation
phenomenon.

Keywords: design iteration; institutional uncertainty; digital product innovation; nascent
industries; mobile application industry
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding how firms innovate in nascent industries has received a significant
upsurge of interest from strategy and entrepreneurship scholars. Particularly, the logic of
opportunity suggests that firms must take actions of iterative search to capture the
fleeting innovation opportunities in nascent industries (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott,
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). While this logic has
considerably enhanced our understanding, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional
context, in which nascent industries are embedded. This is not surprising, because
nascent industries mostly emerge from advanced economies (Vernon, 1979), which tend
to have similar institutional arrangements (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). However, with
the ubiquity of information and communication technologies, firms around the world can
“plug and play” in global competition to foster the emergence of nascent industries in
different institutional contexts (Chakravorti, Tunnard, & Chaturvedi, 2015). Although it
is well accepted that institutional variation can influence firm innovation (Shinkle &
McCann, 2014; Zhao, 2006), little is known about how diverse institutional contexts
associated with nascent industries may shape product innovation, and how firms should
take iterative actions to navigate the heterogeneous landscapes.
In addressing these questions, I investigate how various levels of institutional
uncertainty affect firms’ product innovation. While nascent industries are characterized
by substantial institutional uncertainty (Moeen, Agarwal, & Shah, 2020), its variation
across countries is largely overlooked, and existing theoretical perspectives have
contrasting implications for how different levels of institutional uncertainty may affect
firm innovation. From opportunity logic, the more uncertain the external environment,
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the greater the room for a firm to discover opportunities and to innovate new products
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Eisenhardt, 2002). Conversely, institutional theorists maintain
that firms have a strong preference for a predictable institutional environment to engage
in innovation (Peng, 2003; Xu & Meyer, 2013). When institutional environments are
highly uncertain, firms face significant challenges to make long-term commitments like
innovation (Banalieva, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2015). Combining these contrasting
theoretical perspectives, I propose that there is a U-shape relationship between
institutional uncertainty and product innovation in nascent industries.
Moreover, I investigate how firms strategize design iteration to navigate
institutional uncertainty and create product innovations. In particular, I focus on firms’
use of design iteration, a salient form of iterative search that experiments with alternative
product designs and acquires up-to-date information from the market feedback (Chen,
Wang, Cui, & Li, 2020; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). I argue that design iteration enables
firms to engage in experiential learning, to sense and seize opportunities embedded in an
uncertain and fast-changing setting. In turn, the newly created knowledge through
iteration will help firms better develop innovative solutions to address the unmet needs in
a particular market. Thus, I propose that firms frequently iterating product designs can
better navigate high institutional uncertainty to create product innovations.
I ground my study in the mobile application industry, where firms around the
world can develop and release mobile apps through access to global digital platforms
such as the iOS system and Apple App Store. It has been widely recognized that mobile
app publishers competing in this nascent industry pay tremendous attention to design
iteration (e.g., app updates), which revamps extant product designs and collects up-to-
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date market feedback (Miric & Jeppesen, 2020; Yoo, Boland, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak,
2012). Moreover, this nascent industry is characterized by a fast-changing, uncertain
institutional environment, where regulations and norms regarding the use of mobile apps
frequently shift unexpectedly (European Commission, 2014). Using a sample of 4,629
firms from 54 countries in the mobile app industry, my empirical results provide support
for all my hypotheses.
This study makes several important contributions. First, I contribute to
opportunity logic by highlighting institutional variation in nascent industries. While it is
widely accepted that nascent industries exhibit higher institutional uncertainty compared
to traditional businesses, I recognize that there is a huge variation of institutional contexts
in which nascent industries are embedded. Drawing upon such institutional variation, I
are among the first to theorize and examine how firms should contextualize their
entrepreneurial actions, such as design iteration, to capture opportunities in different local
contexts. Second, this study extends a dynamic view of institutions to examine the role of
institutional uncertainty in innovation. While the institutional perspective mostly treats
uncertainty as a challenge to overcome, I theorize that the influence of institutional
uncertainty is twofold, in which opportunities and challenges for innovation coexist.
Specifically, I flesh out institutional uncertainty as the unpredictable portion of
institutional changes and find a curvilinear relationship between institutional uncertainty
and product innovation. Third, this study also provides practical implications for digital
innovation. It sheds light on how digital entrepreneurs can iterate to innovate, as well as
how policy makers can better develop institutional environments to nurture digital
innovations.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Opportunity logic
Opportunity logic has received increasing attention from both strategy and
entrepreneurship scholars (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). It posits that
superior performance stems from the firm’s ability to capture attractive opportunities
sooner, faster, and better than rivals (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2008). Attractive
opportunities create temporary windows for firms to introduce innovative products with
high potential for revenue and profit (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009; Shane, 2003).
This logic is particularly relevant in nascent industries, where changes are frequent,
unpredictable, and nonlinear (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Even small changes of
external condition may drastically shift the business landscape (Anderson, 1999), giving
rise to abundant flows of short-lived and unpredictable opportunities. To capture these
opportunities, firms must engage in entrepreneurial actions, rather than building
differentiated strategic positions or bundles of valuable resources (Bingham & Eisenhardt,
2008). Thus, understanding how firms strategize entrepreneurial actions represents an
important research venue of opportunity logic.
It is widely recognized that firms take actions of iterative search to pursue
opportunities in the market (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). Since firms
in dynamic environments have difficulties thinking through the consequences of actions
or predicting the future, they rely much less on existing knowledge and much more on
rapidly creating situation-specific new knowledge (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
Eisenhardt, 1989). Recent research finds that firms can effectively generate knowledge
about the up-to-date market conditions by engaging in iteration-related activities (Cohen,
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Bingham, & Hallen, 2019; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Ott & Eisenhardt, 2020). For
instance, Chen et al. (2020) finds that iterating product designs enables firms to reveal,
verify, and address latent demands of users. Opportunity logic has well explored the
implications of design iteration.
Insightful as opportunity logic is, it largely assumes a homogeneous institutional
environment in which nascent industries are embedded. Traditionally, most industries
emerged from advanced economies, as suggested by the product lifecycle theory (Vernon,
1979). For example, the home computer industry started in US in the 1980s and gradually
matured and migrated to other countries over two decades. Due to the advance of
information technologies, innovation in nascent industries is no longer the privilege of
firms in a few advanced economies, but could bloom simultaneously around the world. In
the newly emerged mobile application industry, the presence of digital platforms (e.g.,
iOS) enables firms around the world to “plug and play” in developing mobile apps
(Gupta & Auerswald, 2019; Sibanda & Leke, 2019). Thus, firms operating in
heterogeneous institutional contexts across countries can partake in nascent industries
nowadays.
Moreover, there is increasing appreciation that the significant variation of
institutional environments in nascent industries has important implications for innovation.
Extant literature has long recognized that institutional differences may give rise to an
uneven opportunity landscape and therefore shape firms’ entrepreneurial actions across
different countries (Reuber, Knight, Liesch, & Zhou, 2018). For example, firms are found
to take advantage of innovation opportunities presented by heterogeneous levels of
intellectual property rights protection across countries (Zhao, 2006). Ignoring such cross-
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country variation in the theoretical background of opportunity logic would prevent us
from understanding how firms iterate to navigate the heterogeneous landscape and how
institutional variation shapes innovation in nascent industries. Next, I reveal important
cross-country differences of nascent industries through an institutional perspective.
An institutional perspective on nascent industries
Institutional theorists have drawn on diverse strands to study how institutions matter to
firm strategies and outcomes in nascent industries. It is widely recognized that having the
“right” institution in place provides sufficient legitimacy, resources and incentives to
foster innovation and further industry development (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005;
Armanios, Eesley, Li, & Eisenhardt, 2017). Scholars have strived to identify the
favorable institutional environments that drive product innovation in nascent industries
(Bartholomew, 1997; King et al., 1994). For example, Oxley and Yeung (2001) find that
the cross-country variation of e-commerce development is highly dependent on the rule
of law and availability of credible payment channels. Thus, the level of institutional
development plays an important role in explaining firm innovation in nascent industries.
Recently, a burgeoning research stream goes beyond a static view to adopt a
dynamic view of institutions. This line of research has developed concepts such as
institutional transition (Peng, 2003), institutional fragility (Chauvet & Collier, 2004; Shi,
Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017), political uncertainty (Henisz & Delios, 2001), and institutional
change speed (Banalieva et al., 2015) to capture the heterogeneity of institutional
dynamics across countries. Since institutions are considered the source of stability and
order (e.g., Scott, 2001:181), a basic premise is that any changes to the institutional
environment are considered rare and unpredictable. These studies have significantly
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enhanced our understanding of how institutional dynamics may affect firm strategies and
outcomes.
While a dynamic view of institutions focuses on the likelihood and speed of
institutional changes, it does not directly capture the extent of uncertainty in an
institutional environment. This is an important gap, because extant literature simply
equates uncertainty with frequent institutional changes, without recognizing that firms
competing in turbulent markets may well predict and preempt future institutional changes
based on past patterns. As Knight (1921) explained, “change according to a known law
does not give rise to uncertainty.” For instance, despite the frequent changes of copyright
laws to regulate digital content, Australia was considered to have a relatively predictable
and stable institutional environment for digital startups. This is mostly because these
regulatory changes were following the established precedents to reduce potential
uncertainties (Deloitte, 2018). Hence, it is important for us to flesh out the role of
institutional uncertainty in affecting product innovation in nascent industries.
Institutional uncertainty in nascent industries
The prevalence of institutional uncertainty in nascent industries is well-documented in
extant literature. I define institutional uncertainty as the extent to which changes of an
institutional environment do not exhibit consistent patterns. In nascent industries, the lack
of precedents gives rise to an emerging organizational field permeated with substantial
uncertainty (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Moeen et al., 2020). Even basic assumptions about
how firms should be regulated have not been settled yet (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). Firms
competing in nascent industries must deal with ill-defined legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol,
1994; Rao, 2004), regulatory ambiguities (Langlois, 2003; Marcus, 1981), and fuzzy
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intellectual property scope (Merges & Nelson, 1994; North, 1990). Thus, institutional
uncertainty prevails in nascent industries where institutional environment is still
formative and unsettling.
Although nascent industries are characterized with substantial institutional
uncertainty, it exhibits significant variation across countries. Probing into the digital
sector, Chakravorti et al. (2015) depicted the diverse changing trajectories of the digitalrelated institutional development across 50 major countries and find that some countries
experience significantly higher uncertainty than other countries. For example, the reform
of the Cybersecurity laws in China made it difficult for firms to make predictions about
the future. As the expert of China Cyber policy described: “There is an ever-shifting gray
line”, and “it is not really clear what constitutes personal data, what should be localized
or what the process is” (Voo, 2020). Such uncertainty raised confusion and was expected
to make it increasingly difficult for firms to operate digital business in China (Yan, 2017).
In comparison, Australian digital startups face less institutional uncertainty even though
copyright laws are constantly shifting. As suggested by Chakravorti et al. (2015), the
varying levels of institutional uncertainty across the global digital marketplace have
important implications: firms have to innovate by customizing their approaches to this
digital planet with various institutional uncertainty. Next, I elaborate how I investigate
these issues in the global mobile application industry.
EMPIRICAL GROUNDINGS AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Research context
We study the global mobile application industry, also known as the app economy, as an
important nascent industry with the global coverage. The revenue of mobile apps from
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iOS and Google Play has maintained an unprecedented growing rate of 17% since its
birth in 10 years, exceeding $83 billion in 2019 (Nelson, 2020). Due to the global reach
of digital platforms and app stores, publishers all over the world can join and compete in
this fast-growing sector. It is suggested that about 32.9 percent of app publishers are in
Asia, 29.7 percent are in Europe, 29.4 percent are in North America, and the rest 7%
come from the rest of the world (Lee, 2017). The varying countries of origin expose
publishers to different levels of institutional uncertainty, characterized by unpredictable
changes in regulatory and political environments, readiness of digital infrastructure, and
acceptance of digital products/services by individuals, businesses, and governments (e.g.,
European Commission, 2014; Gupta & Auerswald, 2019; Sibanda & Leke, 2019). It
allows us to examine how the variation of institutional uncertainty may exert implications
on new mobile app innovations across countries.
In addition, given the fast-changing nature of the mobile app sector, publishers
tend to apply opportunity logic in practice, engaging in an iterative and agile approach to
develop new products. Nowadays, over 70% publishers rely on best practices, such as
version updates, A/B tests, gray releases, and other iteration activities to keep up with the
changing environment (Langley, 2017). As a result, the average new mobile app
development time is only 6 months (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017), which allow publishers
to rapidly capture short-lived market opportunities in a dynamic environment. Thus, the
global mobile app industry provides an ideal setting to study how publishers strategize
with opportunity logic under varying levels of institutional uncertainty.
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Institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation: A U-shape relationship
Grounded in the digital context, I consider both the challenges and opportunities firms
confront when facing varying levels of institutional uncertainty from the institutional
perspective and opportunity logic. I argue that there is a U-shape relationship between
institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation.
On the one hand, the institutional perspective suggests that high level of
institutional uncertainty could function as challenges that deter innovation, given the
considerable difficulties to foresee future outcomes of product innovations (Henisz &
Delios, 2001). When institutional uncertainty is high, severe concerns arise regarding
whether the environment will change along a consistent trajectory, preventing firms from
predicting future environmental changes (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Xu & Meyer,
2013). Such inability to predict institutional changes creates challenges associated with
interpreting the support for a product innovation in the future (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott,
2002). It is likely that the newly developed products will not be supported by future
institutional environments, making it difficult to predict whether product innovations
would be welcomed. Given that firms have a strong preference for predictability
(Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), firms prefer to wait until the uncertainty is resolved. In a
highly uncertain institutional environment where the support for digital products is
unpredictable, firms may stall or withdraw the development of new digital products
rather than recklessly proceed. Conversely, when institutional changes are easy to foresee,
firms have strong confidence to preempt future institutional changes, and therefore are
more likely to engage digital product innovation. Consequently, the challenges for firms
to innovate digital products arise with the level of institutional uncertainty.
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On the other hand, the logic of opportunity suggests that institutional uncertainty
is the source of opportunities for product innovation. As noted by Eisenhardt (2002),
“managers must jump into uncertain situations because that is where the opportunities are
most abundant.” When institutional changes are more predictable, opportunities of
innovation can be scarce. Digital publishers can even make adjustments or moderations
on existing products to meet the predicable market changes, while giving little necessity
to develop new innovations. However, when institutional uncertainty is high, there exists
no clear clue how regulators, standard-setting bodies, and business ethics may impose
constraints on the use of new products (Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015). The lack of
constraints blurs the boundary between the digital sector and established industries,
creating tremendous interactions among known and unknown elements across different
industry and social settings, as well as innovation opportunities that are previously nonexistent or unfavored (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Rindova & Courtney, 2020). As the
number of changing factors increases, their potential interactions and associated
innovation opportunities can escalate exponentially (Anderson, 1999; Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997). Therefore, I argue that the opportunities to develop new digital
products exhibit a nonlinear growth pattern as institutional uncertainty increases.
In sum, I propose that, the challenges to innovate digital products gradually
increase with institutional uncertainty whereas the opportunities for innovation accelerate
with institutional uncertainty in a curvilinear pattern (see Figure 2.1). The interplay
between these innovation challenges and opportunities should result in the smooth dotted
U-shape curve in Figure 2.1. When institutional uncertainty is relatively low, the
increasing challenges associated with rising institutional uncertainty dominate in firms’
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digital innovation activities, thereby leading to a downward trend. When the level of
institutional uncertainty is high, the opportunities emerged from unpredictable
institutional changes escalate disproportionately and compensate for the challenges of
innovation, inducing firms to capture them by rapidly innovating digital products. As a
result, I propose that the likelihood that a firm innovates new digital products initially
decreases, but then increases with institutional uncertainty.
H1: There is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product
innovation.
Design iteration and digital product innovation in nascent industries
Opportunity logic is a prominent theoretical lens in explaining product innovation in
nascent industries. This logic suggests that firms competing in nascent industries can take
actions of iterative search to develop innovative solutions for the market (Eisenhardt &
Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017). This is mostly because innovations in nascent industries
rely much less on experience base but more on creating situation-specific new knowledge
to find out what works in novel market contexts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
Particularly, I focus on a salient form of iterative search—design iteration, through which
firms repetitively test and tune their product designs based on market feedback. Design
iteration is widely used in the digital sector and has profound implications on digital
product innovation. For instance, prior research finds that frequent design iteration in the
mobile app industry can significantly enhance the performance of mobile apps (Chen et
al., 2020). In this study, I extend this venue and explore the implications of design
iteration for digital product innovation.
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We argue that frequently iterating designs of the extant digital products advances
firms’ knowledge for developing new ones. Frequent iterations allow firms to test
multiple variations of a specific product design and develop a broad understanding about
viable solutions for unmet market needs. The market feedback from design iterations
provides important cues of customer preferences and the feasibility of alternative
technical solutions that are useful for designing new products (Thomke & Bell, 2001). By
trying out design variations, a firm can gain an intuitive sense of the robustness of
different design specifications and therefore generating more ideas for developing digital
products (MacCormack, Verganti, & Iansiti, 2001).
When firms do not frequently engage in design iterations, they need to turn to
existing experience to develop new products (Chen et al., 2020; Eggers, 2012). In nascent
industries like the mobile application industry, prior experiences can quickly become
obsolete, causing risks when being overgeneralized to current conditions (Argote, 2012;
Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, without fast iterations, firms would neither develop an
accurate understanding about the current market needs, nor be able to effectively
experiment with different product designs to create solutions. Therefore, I argue that
frequent design iterations generate valuable knowledge for firms to develop new digital
products.
H2: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of design iteration and digital
product innovation.
Interaction of institutional uncertainty and design iteration
Following my previously-presented arguments, I expect that the institutional uncertainty
has a curvilinear relationship with digital product innovation. While institutional
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uncertainty plays an important role in shaping firm innovation, opportunity logic suggests
that firms that actively engage in trial-and-error initiatives are better at capturing
opportunities in uncertain environments (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2017; Ott et al., 2017).
My study takes a granular look on firms’ iteration of product designs and attempts to
explore how firms should strategize design iteration to navigate varying levels of
institutional uncertainty.
When the level of institutional uncertainty is low, institutional changes in nascent
industries exhibit a relatively consistent changing trajectory. Under this condition, firms
can largely predict or even preempt institutional changes while making decisions about
future product innovations (Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). Although frequent design
iterations may generate abundant market feedback that mostly supports firms’ projections
about future institutional environments, such iterations and the well aligned market
feedback would only strengthen firms’ confidence about their plans to develop new
digital products, but add little novel elements to their knowledge base. In addition,
considering the potential costs associated with iterations (Li et al., 2017), the benefit of
frequent design iteration may be nominal, if not negative. On the other hand, for firms
that do not frequently experiment with various product designs, their digital innovation
may not necessarily be affected when institutional environments are predictable and
stable. Under such circumstances, firms can still rely on past experiences to steer through
potential institutional changes. Therefore, whether or not firms frequently engage in
iteration may not be a severe issue for digital product innovation when institutional
uncertainty is relatively low.
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However, when institutional environment is characterized with high uncertainty,
firms face considerable difficulties to foresee future institutional changes and the
associated opportunities. Frequent design iterations provide a viable way for firms to
discover and capture the opportunities to develop new digital products, allowing firms to
probe into the uncertain future (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Continuous testing and
tuning of product designs help rectify firms' projections about unpredictable regulatory
changes (McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). Design iteration also functions as a powerful
learning device to identify abnormal changes and uncover new opportunities. Conversely,
if firms do not actively engage in design iteration, they could not timely scan the
uncertain environment to identify opportunities, hindering firms from advancing their
understanding of the fit between product designs and shifting market conditions
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Therefore, they could not rapidly develop a new digital
product when unexpected opportunities emerge. In sum, I argue frequent iterations may
better prepare firms to probe into and capture opportunities to develop new digital
products under a highly uncertain institutional environment, steepening the nonlinear
trend of opportunity in Figure 2.1.
H3: The U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product
innovation is positively moderated by the frequency of design iteration, making the
curvilinear relationship steeper in the end of high institutional uncertainty.
METHODOLOGY
Data and sample selection
To test my hypotheses, I utilize a sample of mobile app publishers with international
coverage. I obtain the data from Apptopia, a leading analyst firm in the mobile
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application industry, which tracks the data of Apple App Stores in 58 major country
markets. This dataset archives comprehensive information about mobile app
characteristics for the period from January 1st, 2015 to December 31st, 2017, including
important variables like release dates, categories, descriptions, and in-app purchases, as
well as information on publishers’ product portfolios, their downloads and revenue,
headquarter location, etc. To supplement this data, I also obtain the Networked Readiness
Index data from the World Economic Forums, which captures the institutional conditions
of 139 countries in utilizing information and communication technologies. These datasets
together allow us to investigate and compare the influence of institutions on the
innovation activities of mobile app publishers across countries.
Following prior studies using mobile app datasets (Ghose & Han, 2014; Kapoor
& Agarwal, 2017; Chen et al., 2020), I employ a “top segmentation” approach to
construct my research sample. Kapoor and Agarwal (2017) argue that the top
segmentation approach provides an ideal sampling procedure because the distribution of
publisher revenue and downloads is heavily skewed, and the total number of publishers is
enormous. As an indication of this distribution, over half (55%) of mobile app revenue is
generated by the top 100 publishers, with the rest taken up by the other 1,500,000
publishers (Pollen VC Report, 2015). Adopting a random sampling approach with this
dataset runs the risk of including a multitude of amateur publishers (Boudreau &
Jeppesen, 2015), who do not put much emphasis on innovation and profitability. Thus,
the “top segmentation” approach is suitable for us to identify publishers who are actively
engaged in innovation. For the sample, I select publishers that have developed apps
ranked top 1000 in the iOS overall category during January 2015 to December 2017 in
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any market. Then I keep those publishers that have detailed information about all the key
variables. This process leads to a final sample of 4,629 publishers headquartered in 54
countries.
Measures
Dependent variable. Digital product innovation. I conceptualized innovation as
firms’ implementation of novel ideas to fulfill specific market needs by introducing new
products, in line with previous innovation studies (Damanpour, 1987; Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1995). In the digital sector, product innovation involves implementing
incumbent digital technologies to serve newly emerged product markets, rather than
creating new-to-the-market technological solutions. I used the publisher-year count of
new mobile app introductions by the focal publisher. For example, although Didi is not
the first to introduce the car-sharing service, the fact that it has successfully implemented
the car-sharing idea and technologies in the Chinese market qualifies it as a digital
product innovation in my definition. Similar operationalizations are also used in recent
studies focusing on the mobile app industry (e.g., Miric & Jeppesen, 2020). Thus, my
study focuses on how institutional uncertainty affects app publishers’ efforts to pursue
market opportunities with new products.
Independent variables. Institutional uncertainty. To measure institutional
uncertainty, I focus on the laws related to the information and communications
technology (ICT) industries, such as the e-commerce laws, consumer privacy protection,
cybersecurity laws, copyright laws, etc. These regulations specify the legal arrangements
regarding what should or should not be done when doing business in the digital sector.
World Economic Forum (WEF) surveys executives all over the world to assess the
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development level of their countries’ laws relating to the use of ICTs. Moreover, WEF
constructs a comprehensive dataset, named the Networked Readiness Index, which
broadly assesses the extent to which a country’s political, legal and economic framework
supports the development of ICT related industries in each year from 2012 to 2016. ICT
related laws share a high correlation (coeff. > 0.9) with the composite numbers of the
Networked Readiness Index, indicating that ICT related laws generally reflect the
variation of the overall digital institutional environment. To illustrate the robustness of
my results, I also conduct additional tests using the Network Readiness Index as an
alternative measure.
From this foundation, I then develop a measure for institutional uncertainty. I seek
to find out how much of the variation in ICT laws can be explained by historical data,
based on the changing trajectories of the ICT related laws in the past three years. I follow
Wholey and Brittain (1989) and define a measure of uncertainty based on the explanatory
power of historical data (Claussen et al., 2018). I run a regression for each country in
each year, in which I regress a linear time trend on the ICT laws. The R2 of this
regression represents the part of the ICT laws variation that can be explained by an
overall time trend. Accordingly, the 1- R2 is the percentage of the unpredictable variation
of ICT laws. This definition allows us to empirically distinguish between countries with
different levels of uncertainty. Higher values of uncertainty mean the country is
experiencing changes in the digital-related institutional environment that are difficult to
anticipate based on historical data.
Design iteration. Like any software, mobile apps are technologically flexible and
are open to post-introduction adjustments (Nambisan et al., 2017). In the Apple App
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Store, after launching a new app, publishers regularly release app updates to refine design
specifications and/or add novel features in response to new problems raised by existing
users. Each update can be downloaded and installed as a new version of the original app.
Information systems research has used updates to examine software evolution (Tiwana,
2015). In the mobile app industry, publishers are following the semantic versioning
standard, which is based on three digits (i.e., Version 1.2.0, 3.7.2), to release new updates.
Typically, an increment in the first digit means significant improvements or changes in
interface, features and functionality; an increment in the second digit reflects relatively
minor feature changes and/or additions; and an increment in the third digit implies
marginal changes or bug fixes (Chen et al., 2020). Thus, in order to distinguish design
iterations from bug-fixing releases, I use the monthly-average of changes in the first and
second digit of given publishers’ mobile apps in the focal year as the proxy of the
frequency of design iterations.
Control variables. I also identify a set of controls that can potentially affect the
innovation behavior of mobile app publishers, and I categorize these controls according
to publisher and country attributes. At the publisher level, I control for the influence of
product diversification and international diversification on innovation (Hitt, Hoskisson, &
Kim, 1997). I construct the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), represented as 1
– ∑(Pi2), where p is the percentage of downloads for each category i. To measure
international diversification, I use the HHI based on downloads for the measure of
international diversification (Hitt et al., 1997; Kistruck et al., 2013). I use the number of
apps released by the publisher as a measure of portfolio size (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). I
also use the average app file size to capture publisher technological sophistication
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(Ghose & Han, 2014). Moreover, to account for the influence of installed base on
innovation, I include the number of downloads for publishers’ mobile apps (Schilling,
2002). At the country level, I follow previous research on institutional dynamics
(Banalieva et al., 2015) to control for the speed of institutional change and the level of
institutional development to ensure that I isolate the effect of uncertainty from other
characteristics of the institutional environment. The speed measure is the coefficient in
the time trend regression when constructing the uncertainty measure; the level of
institutional development is the development level of ICT related laws. To avoid
potential simultaneity confounds, all independent and control variables are lagged by one
year.
Analysis
Our dependent variable is a highly skewed count measure, and its variance exceeds its
mean. I thus use a negative binomial model to fit the count data with overdispersion.
Furthermore, because there are multiple observations for each publisher in the data, I
employ panel count models to account for the nonindependence of these observations.
Following previous studies with similar data structures (e.g., Zelner et al., 2009), I
employ the population-averaged rather than fixed effects (FE) estimators for several
reasons. First, using fixed-effects models may have forcefully dropped publisher samples
that do not introduce any new games throughout the observation window. Second, fixedeffects models also neglect between-publisher variation, which is a key focus of this
paper in comparing publishers with different gamer bases. Therefore, I estimate a
population-averaged panel model with negative binomial estimators.
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Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation metrics. The correlation table
suggests that bivariate correlations are unlikely to be a concern, given that all are smaller
than 0.37 (Kennedy, 2003). In addition, I calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) in
all models, including all the interaction terms. The average VIF is 1.25, which is below
the threshold level of 5 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990).
In Model 1 of Table 2, I only include control variables. In Model 2, I include
institutional uncertainty and its squared term. The positive and significant coefficient
(coeff. = 0.428, p = 0.004) for the squared term of institutional uncertainty supports H1,
indicating a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product
innovation. This highlights that digital product innovations are prompted when the
institutional environment changes in a highly predictable or unpredictable way. To test
Hypothesis 2, I add design iteration in Model 3. The results illustrate that there is a
positive and significant relationship between design iteration and digital product
innovation (coeff. = 0.479, p =0.000). It suggests that with one more design iteration
every month, the likelihood of introducing a digital product innovation increases by
61.4%. Thus, H2 is well supported.
To test Hypothesis 3, in Model 4, I find that the interaction between the squared
term of institutional uncertainty and design iteration is positive and statistically
significant (coeff. = 1.261, p =0.044 in Model 4). Given that I use the negative binomial
model as a typical nonlinear specification, I implement the recommended procedures by
Kotha, Zheng, & George (2011). I find that the slopes at the 99th percentile of
institutional uncertainty steepen as the level of frequency increases. In addition, to further
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interpret whether the U-shape moderation effect concerns the shift of the turning point, I
use the Stata code nlcom to test whether the derivative of the turning point is indeed
significantly different from zero (Haans et al., 2016). The results show that the turning
point does not change significantly while the slope of the U-shape, especially on the high
uncertainty side, becomes steeper.
Figure 2 provides visual supports to further interpret the results in Model 4
(Criscuolo, Dahlander, Grohsjean, & Salter, 2017). Figure 3 presents the predicted
number of digital product innovation across different levels of moderators, where the
high level of design iteration is mean + 1 S. D., and the low level of design iteration is
mean – 1 S. D. It shows that high design iteration frequency makes the U-shape curve
steeper, especially when institutional uncertainty is high. Put differently, in a highly
uncertain institutional environment, the number of digital product innovations created by
firms with high design iteration frequency is significantly higher than that of firms with
low design iteration frequency. These findings coincide with my theoretical arguments
that frequent design iterations enable firms to create more product innovation when
institutional uncertainty is high.
Robustness tests
We conduct several sets of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of my findings.
First, while my focus on the ICT related laws captures the critical aspect of digital-related
institutional environments, I also conduct robustness tests to illustrate that my results still
hold when I adopt a comprehensive index. I reconstruct institutional uncertainty based on
the composite score of the Network Readiness Index, which broadly accounts for
regulatory and political environments, readiness of digital infrastructure, and acceptance
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of digital products/services by individuals, businesses, and governments. I reexamine all
my hypotheses using this measurement, and the results in Table 2.3 suggest that all
hypotheses are well supported.
Second, I also assess whether reverse causality can be a concern in my research
context. While I have followed a mainstream approach and lagged all the predicting
variables by one year, I also reverse the independent and dependent variables to test the
possibility of reverse causality (Li et al., 2018). Specifically, I consider firm’s digital
product innovations in year t – 1 as the focal independent variable, and institutional
uncertainty in year t as the dependent variable. I do not find a significant main effect in
this direction. This suggests that reverse causality is less likely to be a concern in my
research context. However, I also admit the possibility of reverse causality in considering
study limitations, as the interplay between institutional changes and actors’ movement
can be a potential issue.
Third, I include national cultures as control variables. Prior entrepreneurship
literature suggests that national cultural dimensions like uncertainty avoidance may
directly affect entrepreneurs’ perceptions of institutional uncertainty (McMullen &
Shepherd, 2006). I include four well-recognized cultural dimensions as control variables:
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and feminism. My main effect still
receives relatively strong support with p values smaller than 0.1.
Fourth, I mitigate the concern that my results may be affected by the institutional
environment of foreign markets. I include a new control – the ratio of total downloads
from foreign markets – into my regression models. I replicate all analyses and the results
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well support all my hypotheses, indicating that my finding is not biased by firms’
exposure to the institutional environments of foreign markets.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, I explore how varying levels of institutional uncertainty across countries
shape firm innovation in nascent industries and how firms strategize design iteration to
navigate institutional uncertainty. By infusing opportunity logic with the institutional
perspective, I argue that institutional uncertainty has a curvilinear impact, i.e., U-shape,
on product innovation, and that this effect is moderated by firms’ design iteration. Based
on the empirical investigation of new mobile app releases in a sample of 4,629 firms from
54 countries, I find that firms are most likely to introduce digital product innovations
when institutional uncertainty is extremely low or high. I further find that frequent design
iterations enable firms to capture the underlying opportunities to create digital product
innovation in a given country when the country’s institutional uncertainty is high. Thus,
my empirical results provide support for all hypotheses. This study offers important
contributions to opportunity logic, a dynamic view of institutions, and the phenomenon of
digital innovation.
First, I contribute to opportunity logic by highlighting institutional variation in
nascent industries. Opportunity logic is theoretically intriguing because it pushes beyond
the boundary conditions of traditional strategic logics (e.g., position, leverage). While
traditional logics suggest that firms sustain competitive advantages through differential
positioning or valuable resources, opportunity logic focuses on the fast-changing,
uncertain settings, such as nascent industries, where resources and positions could be
quickly rendered obsolete (D’Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010). While this particular
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focus helps unveil how firms engage in iteration-related activities to capture fleeting
opportunities in nascent industries (Ott et al., 2017), it also assumes a level playing field
in nascent industries. In other words, opportunity logic largely presupposes a
homogeneously uncertain and fast-changing environment in the background, which
neglects the significant institutional variation.
I am among the first to theorize and examine the role of institutional context in
opportunity logic. Given the importance of the integration between traditional strategic
logics and the institutional perspective (Peng et al., 2008), I see it as an important
initiative to channel this emerging strategic logic with the wisdom of institutional
theorists. I recognize that various institutional contexts may shape opportunity landscapes
in different ways (North, 1990), requiring firms to strategize differently to capture
opportunities. Specifically, I examine how firms should contextualize their design
iteration strategies to pursue innovation opportunities under different levels of
institutional uncertainty. I find that firms should frequently iterate product designs when
they are embedded in a country with high institutional uncertainty, because intensive
search efforts keep firms updated about the new situation-specific knowledge, which is
necessary to probe into and capture opportunities in an uncertain environment. On the
other hand, when institutional context is less uncertain, firms can better predict and
preempt future institutional changes so that there is relatively less need to expend efforts
on design iteration.
This finding reveals that learning and innovation processes are shaped by the
institutional context (Levinthal, 2020). Particularly, firms should pay strong attention to
how they arrange learning processes to navigate the constantly shifting business
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landscape in nascent industries. While this study highlights the frequency of design
iteration, future studies could explore the temporal dimensions of a wide array of learning
processes (e.g., trial-and-error learning, improvisation, experimentation). For example,
Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) have noted that high-tech firms tend to use rhythms to
arrange their product experimentations. To date, I still know very little about their
implications. Furthermore, I call for future research on opportunity logic to direct more
attention to the role of other institutional arrangements. Previous research suggests that
regulations, such as bankruptcy laws, contribute to a favorable institutional environment
that encourages entrepreneurial actions (Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007; Reuber et al., 2018).
To date, I still lack understanding on what institutional contexts prompt firms to better
capture opportunities in this turbulent age. Moreover, as it is increasingly convenient for
firms to tap into foreign markets, it is worth exploring a “born global” perspective to
understand how opportunities scattered across different countries may simultaneously
exert significant influence on innovation (Knight & Liesch, 2016). While my study
focuses on the influence of the domestic institutional environment by controlling for
firm’s level of international diversification, I encourage future research to explore how
firms seize the heterogeneous opportunities across different institutional contexts. In sum,
I think these are exciting venues to pursue. Theoretically, it encourages us to further
develop opportunity logic and incorporate perspectives from international business
research to address these complex questions. Practically, the findings could also inform
latest practices about how high-tech startups should configure business models to create
and capture value across countries.
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Second, this study extends a dynamic view of institutions by theorizing the role of
institutional uncertainty. A dynamic institution-based view is of critical importance to
understand how institutional dynamics shape firm’s decision-making (Banalieva et al.,
2015). This burgeoning view has a strong focus on how institutional environments
change over time, instead of the traditional emphasis on the development level of
institutions. Extant literature has shown that a shifting institutional environment induces
significant uncertainty that deters firms from making long-term investments (Banalieva et
al., 2015; Chen, Cui, Li, & Rolfe, 2017; Kim et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2017). However, in
nascent industries, the institutional environment is constantly changing, and firms are
accustomed to the occurrences of institutional changes (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2009). Furthermore, firms may well predict and preempt future institutional
changes to introduce new products (Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). In other words, a
shifting institutional environment does not necessarily incur uncertainty.
In addressing this gap, I capture institutional uncertainty by focusing on the
inconsistent patterns of institutional changes. By doing so, I extend a dynamic view of
institutions in recognizing that institutional changes could be well preempted if they
follow previous changing trajectories. It is an important extension as it departs from the
conventional wisdom that institutions are relatively stable over a long period of time and
helps create new insights that treat institutional dynamics as the norm. Moreover, I
complement the institutional perspective by emphasizing that institutional uncertainty not
only induces challenges but creates opportunities for innovation. This theoretical insight
depicts a comprehensive picture of how firms make decisions under uncertainty. While
institutional uncertainty may force firms to adopt a “wait and see” approach (e.g.,
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Banalieva et al., 2015; Henisz & Delios, 2001), it could also encourage firms to “grab”
the opportunities (Rindova & Courtney, 2020). I uncover a U-shape relationship between
institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation. I argue that low institutional
uncertainty reduces the costs of interpreting the appropriateness of a product innovation
in the future, while high institutional uncertainty gives rise to new market niches where
opportunities emerge for developing products or services. Meanwhile, firms that stay in a
moderate level of institutional uncertainty bear the full brunt of the costs and have fewer
incentives to develop new products.
Third, my study offers timely insights to the digital innovation phenomenon for
policy makers and managers. I identify the favorable institutional conditions at the
country level that foster digital innovation. While extant literature mostly studies the
influence of institutional development (Bartholomew, 1997; King et al., 1994; Oxley &
Yeung, 2001), I find that the dynamics of institutional environments play an important
role in explaining firm innovation. This has important implications in the global digital
transformation. As I are currently situated in the flux of diverse digital regulatory
standards, countries, whether developed or developing ones, are actively experimenting
and shifting among these alternative digital-related institutions to find what works for
them. The induced institutional dynamics throughout this experimentation process may
significantly influence digital innovation and determine the competitiveness of countries
in the digital sector. Thus, my study directs more attention from the level of institutional
development to the changing trajectory of these institutions.
Furthermore, my focus on design iteration may inform practices about how
entrepreneurs should manage digital innovation. Recently, there is a heated, ongoing
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discussion among entrepreneurs regarding agile development and lean startup, both of
which emphasize the importance of iteration-related activities to digital product
development (Levinthal & Contigiani, 2019). However, iteration is not the panacea for
innovation. It is reported to incur considerable financial costs and employee stress (Li et
al., 2017; Schreier, 2017). Thus, entrepreneurs pay substantial attention to how they
should schedule each round of iteration so that they could develop innovative products
with high efficiency and low costs. I highlight that an important factor to consider is the
institutional contexts in which they are embedded. The benefit of design iteration in
countries characterized with relatively low uncertainty may not be comparative to
iterating under high institutional uncertainty. Therefore, my findings offer valuable
insights for firms to customize their arrangement of iteration activities in or across
different country markets.
I also acknowledge that my theorization in this study has important limitations in
terms of generalizability. An assumption of a high-velocity market, such as nascent
industries, underlies the use of opportunity logic (Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2008).
Attractive flows of opportunities may result in superior performance in this context
because valuable resources and differential positions are short-lived and can be quickly
rendered obsolete. Thus, my theoretical arguments can be well applied to industrial
environments that are characterized by unpredictable and rapid changes. In relatively
stable markets, iteration may still enable firms to learn but should be considered less
effective. Moreover, my focus on the digital sector assumes a highly flexible and agile
product development process, which greatly enhances firms' capability to capture fleeting
opportunities. For example, new mobile app development takes six months on average
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(Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). In nascent industries where product development takes much
longer (e.g., biotech), the U-shape curve of the relationship between institutional
uncertainty and innovation may be less likely to be observed because the emerged
opportunities are difficult to capture before they become outdated. Nevertheless, with the
strong momentum of digitalization, I expect that the product development processes
would be transformed in many industries, enabling more firms to capture opportunities
rapidly.
Given that this study is among the first to investigate how firms iterate under
uncertain institutional environments, the findings and inferences from the study are also
subject to a number of empirical caveats that suggest opportunities for future research. As
my research context focuses on the nascent phenomenon of digital product innovation,
data availability at the firm level is a major concern. For example, the iOS platform
mostly collects app-level information, which may constrain my ability to provide a
complete data series for firms’ characteristics (e.g., ownership, R&D spending). Despite
my efforts to construct firm level proxies like portfolio size, technical sophistication, and
installed base to control for important firm attributes in this setting, I hope that future
studies may incorporate more fine-grained firm level variables to account for firm
dynamics.
In addition, while I have identified the home country of each mobile app publisher,
I do not have detailed information on the location of product development. Therefore, I
could not rule out the possibility that product development may be conducted outside the
home country. It is less of a concern in the mobile app industry, as most publishers are
startups that could not afford to set up subsidiaries in foreign countries. Moreover, my
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focus on the iOS platform may also lead to selection issues and could not account for
platform diversification strategies. Although I have controlled for iOS market share in
each country to reduce this concern, future studies may integrate observations from both
iOS and Android to construct a comprehensive dataset.
CONCLUSION
Grounded in nascent industries, this paper explores which institutional contexts create
opportunities for firm innovation and how firms take iterative actions to pursue these
opportunities. I infuse opportunity logic with institutional perspective and find that there
is a U-shape relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation.
This study also sheds light on the role of design iteration in facilitating firms’ capture of
innovation opportunities under high institutional uncertainty. Thus, this study contributes
to the development of opportunity logic, extends a dynamic view of institutions, and
offers timely insights to understand the digital innovation phenomenon.
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics and correlation table
Variables
1 Digital product innovation
2 Institutional uncertainty
3 Design iteration
4 Level of institutional development
5 Speed of institutional change
6 International diversification
7 Product diversification
8 Portfolio size
9 Firm technological sophistication
10 Installed base
MEAN
S.D.

1
1.00
0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.01
0.05
0.07
0.02
0.20
4.17
31.41

2

3

4

5

1.00
0.00
0.21
0.07
-0.01
-0.03
0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.41
0.23

1.00
0.04
0.01
-0.14
-0.15
0.21
0.15
-0.22
0.37
0.39

1.00
-0.06
-0.07
-0.03
0.07
0.03
0.03
4.97
0.52

1.00
0.13
-0.09
-0.03
-0.01
-0.06
-0.03
0.09

Variables
6
7
8
9
1 Digital product innovation
2 Institutional uncertainty
3 Design iteration
4 Level of institutional development
5 Speed of institutional change
1.00
6 International diversification
0.00
1.00
7 Product diversification
-0.25
-0.01
1.00
8 Portfolio size
-0.06
-0.30
0.24
1.00
9 Firm technological sophistication
-0.03
0.37
0.33
-0.06
10 Installed base
0.78
0.30
7.27
17.20
MEAN
0.22
0.29
2.01
1.15
S.D.
Note: Absolute correlations greater or equal to 0.02 are significant at p<0.05.
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10

1.00
2.53
1.25

Table 2.2 The relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product
innovation
(1)
Institutional uncertainty

(H1)

Institutional uncertainty2

Design iteration

(2)
-0.379*
(0.148)
[0.010]
0.428**
(0.147)
[0.004]

(H2)

(3)
-0.400**
(0.148)
[0.007]
0.445**
(0.147)
[0.003]
0.479***
(0.057)
[0.000]

Institutional uncertainty *
Design iteration
Institutional uncertainty2 *
Design iteration

Level of institutional
development

Speed of institutional change

International diversification

Product diversification

Portfolio size

Firm technological
sophistication

Installed base

Year Fixed Effects
Observations

(4)
0.030
(0.295)
[0.918]
-0.067
(0.292)
[0.817]
0.509***
(0.092)
[0.000]
-1.056
(0.635)
[0.096]
1.261*
(0.627)

(H3)

-0.026

-0.031

-0.030

[0.044]
-0.031

(0.025)
[0.293]
-0.017
(0.132)
[0.895]
-0.009
(0.060)
[0.883]
0.401***
(0.049)
[0.000]
0.062***
(0.007)
[0.000]
0.159***

(0.025)
[0.207]
-0.077
(0.135)
[0.571]
-0.021
(0.060)
[0.725]
0.399***
(0.049)
[0.000]
0.062***
(0.007)
[0.000]
0.159***

(0.025)
[0.221]
-0.072
(0.135)
[0.596]
0.008
(0.060)
[0.899]
0.386***
(0.049)
[0.000]
0.050***
(0.008)
[0.000]
0.151***

(0.025)
[0.215]
-0.064
(0.135)
[0.634]
0.008
(0.060)
[0.898]
0.390***
(0.050)
[0.000]
0.050***
(0.008)
[0.000]
0.151***

(0.012)
[0.000]
0.704***
(0.012)
[0.000]
YES
11968

(0.012)
[0.000]
0.704***
(0.012)
[0.000]
YES
11968

(0.012)
[0.000]
0.725***
(0.012)
[0.000]
YES
11968

(0.012)
[0.000]
0.726***
(0.012)
[0.000]
YES
11968
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Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets, ***<0.001;
**<0.01;*<0.05. All tests are two-tailed.
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Table 2.3 The relationship between institutional uncertainty and digital product
innovation
(1)
Institutional uncertainty

(H1)

Institutional uncertainty2

Design iteration

(2)
-0.500***
(0.150)
[0.001]
0.416**
(0.161)
[0.010]

(H2)

(3)
-0.493**
(0.150)
[0.001]
0.420**
(0.161)
[0.009]
0.451***
(0.058)
[0.000]

Institutional uncertainty * Design
iteration
Institutional uncertainty2 *
Design iteration

Level of institutional
development

(4)
0.199
(0.300)
[0.507]
-0.368
(0.320)
[0.251]
0.573***
(0.082)
[0.000]
-1.714**
(0.647)
[0.008]
1.959**
(0.698)

(H3)

-0.059**

-0.066**

-0.067**

[0.005]
-0.065**

(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.022)
[0.005]
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.003]
Speed of institutional change
0.075
-0.155
-0.194
-0.207
(0.248)
(0.264)
(0.264)
(0.264)
[0.762]
[0.557]
[0.464]
[0.433]
International diversification
-0.014
-0.025
0.002
0.000
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.061)
[0.813]
[0.683]
[0.970]
[0.998]
Product diversification
0.457*** 0.454***
0.442*** 0.445***
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.051)
(0.051)
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
***
***
***
Portfolio size
0.070
0.070
0.059
0.059***
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.008)
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
Firm technological sophistication
0.171*** 0.170***
0.163*** 0.163***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
***
***
***
Installed base
0.700
0.699
0.718
0.718***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.013)
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
Year Fixed Effects
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
11968
11968
11968
11968
Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets, ***<0.001;
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**<0.01;*<0.05. All tests are two-tailed.
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Figure 2.1 Effects of institutional uncertainty on digital product innovation
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Figure 2.2 The moderation effect of design iteration frequency on the relationship
between institutional uncertainty and digital product innovation
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CHAPTER 3
LIKE CLOCKWORK? DESIGN ITERATION RHYTHMS AND THE
DIVERSIFICATION OF DIGITAL STARTUPS

Abstract: Design iteration is an important, yet understudied, topic for understanding how
digital startups compete in evolving and diverse market conditions. While extant
literature has indicated the benefits of rhythms in organizing strategic activities in
established firms, little consideration has been given to whether and under what
conditions digital startups utilize rhythms to organize design iterations. Based on a
sample of 110 digital startups in the global mobile game industry, I find that digital
startups tend to use rhythms for design iterations. Moreover, different types of market
diversification exert opposing influences on the enactment of design iteration rhythms.
This study contributes to current understanding of design iterations and to strategic
rhythms research.

Keywords: rhythms; design iteration; diverse markets; digital startup; mobile game
industry
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INTRODUCTION
Design iterations, which repetitively revamp product designs, are of critical importance in
today’s business landscape. This is particularly true for digital startups, many of which
rely on iterations of the initial product to keep up with shifting market conditions. For
instance, in its early stages, Google iteratively revamped its search engine to
accommodate the evolving needs of advertisers and search users, enabling it to surpass a
$1 billion revenue milestone within 48 months of its establishment (Docherty, 2019;
Statista, 2019). Design iterations are widely used by digital startups, and it is suggested
that these iterations account for the vast majority of economic value created by these
startups (Langley, 2017; Saleh, 2017). In turn, scholars and practitioners have been
seeking to understand how digital startups manage product development (Nambisan et al.,
2017), particularly design iterations.
Extant literature has offered divergent theoretical insights that can be used to
consider this issue. On the one hand, it is suggested that product development needs to be
rolled out promptly, in order to make product offerings stay relevant and innovative
(Iansiti & MacCormack, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). For digital startups, this
approach aligns with their capacity for being agile and responsive (Childers, 2019). On
the other hand, scholars have noted that firms develop new products with rhythms,
maintaining regular time intervals between product development. Using rhythms is
suggested to help facilitate coordination and enable firms to be more focused (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997). By extension, digital startups may regularly introduce design iterations,
and exhibit consistent time intervals in introducing them. Some very successful digital
startups (e.g., SpaceApe) have attributed their extreme growth to the use of rhythm-
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related business practices (Batchelor, 2017; Gupta & Rood, 2012), and have strongly
encouraged the approach of fixed time intervals for each cycle of design iteration. These
conflicting arguments and observations from practice raise considerable questions
regarding how digital startups organize design iterations -- with rhythms or not.
Moreover, few studies have empirically investigated this issue.
To address this gap, I examine whether digital startups use rhythms for design
iterations. Rhythms have become an increasingly important temporal lens for examining
the strategic activities of firms. Extant literature suggests that established firms are
incentivized to use stable temporal structures like rhythms across a wide range of
strategic activities, including innovation, internationalization, acquisition, and strategic
change (Ahuja et al., 2013; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Klarner & Raisch, 2013;
Laamanen & Keil, 2008; Turner et al., 2013; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Yet, the
literature has provided little insight or evidence as to why and whether startups might also
utilize rhythms, which is salient as agile responses to changes are often viewed as a
central element of strategy for startups (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Zahra & Garvis,
2000). In this paper, I propose that even digital startups tend to develop regular rhythms
for their design iteration activities. I draw on a coordination logic (Becker, 2004; Nelson
& Winter, 1982) to argue that digital startups seek to diminish the difficulties in internal
coordination and therefore develop rhythms to organize design iterations. In other words,
the considerable opportunities for coordination efficiencies in design iteration drive these
firms to develop rhythms.
Further, I examine the boundary conditions of using design iteration rhythms, i.e.,
the conditions under which digital startups prefer to employ regular rhythms rather than
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rapidly respond to market changes. Specifically, I investigate how competing in diverse
markets may influence digital startups’ adherence to rhythmic design iterations. This is
important because market diversification is not uncommon for digital startups, given their
convenient access to multiple markets through digital affordances, e.g., iOS app store
(Shaheer & Li, 2020; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 2008). Diversification requires startups to
simultaneously accommodate evolving conditions in heterogenous markets, imposing
considerable challenges on internal coordination and market responsiveness (Eisenhardt
et al., 2010). Yet, I know little about how startups arrange their design iteration rhythms
to address these challenges. In this paper, I propose that two types of market
diversification, platform diversification and international diversification, affect digital
startups’ adherence to design iteration rhythms. I argue that these types of market
diversification exert opposing influences on design iteration rhythms, given the distinct
challenges in these diverse markets.
This paper empirically examines the presence of design iteration rhythms in the
mobile game industry. The mobile game sector is characterized by diverse and frequently
evolving conditions regarding regulations, technologies, consumer demand and
competition, thereby providing an ideal context to study design iterations. In particular,
game updates represent the dominant form of design iterations in this context. Mobile
game publishers rely heavily on game updates to redesign gameplay, release new product
content, and generate improved game designs based on market feedback (Ascarza et al.,
2019). It is suggested that more than 60% of total revenues are generated through
continuous updates, rather than upfront payment, and over 50% of total expenses are
attributed to updates (Li et al., 2017; Saleh, 2017). Moreover, given the nascency of this
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sector, young startups play an important role in developing the mobile game industry. I
examine my hypotheses with a sample of 110 mobile game startups and find evidence in
support of my hypotheses. In doing so, my study contributes to current understanding of
design iterations and strategic rhythms literature.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Design iterations
A conventional view of product development encompasses meticulous upfront planning
to translate product concepts to design specifications and then to final products (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1995). However, this approach can face considerable challenges in an
uncertain technological environment like the digital sector. This is because the outcome
of traditional product development may become obsolete by the time of product launch
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989), suggesting incentive for a more
flexible approach. And in order to deal with fast external changes in the digital era, firms
may adopt a more flexible and agile approach when developing new products (Iansiti &
MacCormack, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). With design iterations, firms can flexibly
revamp product designs (Chen et al., 2020; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Specifically,
design iterations enable them to adapt to up-to-date market conditions and enhance the
value of product innovations (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2017). Thus, design iterations
need to be rolled out in time to keep up with the market changes (e.g., shifts in consumer
tastes, competitor moves, technological events). A typical form of design iterations in the
digital sector is generational updates of software. Updates allow software companies to
flexibly adjust and test product designs within their current user base or selective
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customer groups (Tiwana, 2015), thereby learning about consumer demand and
technological shifts.
To illustrate how iteration works within my empirical context, I elaborate on
game update introductions by publishers of mobile games. Game updates often consist of
new game content or features (e.g., new maps, champions, weapons, or skins), limited
time events (e.g., New Year sale), and changes of game designs. A common approach for
mobile game publishers is to first collect user feedback on their extant game design and
then analyze whether users’ interactions with the game design is consistent with
publishers’ expectations, followed by generating up-to-date understanding about users’
status, and then strategically changing game designs and releasing new content to keep
users excited (Rayport et al., 2017). In particular, sticking to regular rhythms has been
suggested as a key strategy to organize iteration activities. Some very successful mobile
game startups have revealed that they intentionally release updates at a consistent rate,
e.g., weekly or monthly, and have attributed their success to these regular updates
(Batchelor, 2017; Gupta & Rood, 2012). To better understand rhythms for design
iteration, I next consider the strategy research on rhythms more generally.
Rhythms and strategic activities
Rhythms are so common that their strategic benefits are easy to overlook. Firms
intentionally enact temporal structure to manage a series of actions over time for the
purpose of achieving strategic goals (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Kunisch et al., 2017).
Arguably, most scholarly attention has been devoted to regular rhythms5, which exhibit
5

Terms like temporal consistency (Turner et al., 2013) and temporal dispersion (Wang

and Zatzick, 2019) are also used.
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consistent time intervals between strategic activities. Regular rhythms have been found in
a wide array of strategic activities in established firms, ranging from innovation (Turner
et al., 2013; Ahuja et al., 2013), internationalization (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002),
acquisition (Laamanen & Keil, 2008), strategic change (Klarner & Raisch, 2013), and top
management team turnover (Wang & Zatzick, 2019). In this work, the common logic is
that firms have strong incentives to regulate internal efforts over time in order to attain
efficiencies. For example, routines theory suggests that firms can reduce coordination
costs among multiple actors by repetitively performing the same activity according to the
same time interval (Becker, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982).
While these insights are intuitive and powerful, less is known about whether
rhythms are used in entrepreneurial settings and what boundary conditions are present for
using them. It has long been recognized that startups tend to be flexible and can respond
quickly to unanticipated situations (Carter et al., 1994). Startups are generally less
bureaucratic, structured, and diversified than larger firms, so they are often perceived as
more agile and responsive to external changes (Ebben & Johnson, 2005; Liao et al.,
2003); they also have fewer formal processes in place and perform fewer planning
activities (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). As such, in turbulent market conditions, such firms
may seek to keep up with the environment by adjusting their rate of product introduction
based on the evolving rate of environmental changes (Bakker & Knoben, 2015; Barry et
al., 2006; Chen & Nadkarni, 2017). However, scholars have also shown that some
successful high-tech startups adhere to time-paced, regular rhythms in turbulent
environments (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). This tension points to a need for greater
understanding regarding whether startups employ rhythms to organize strategic activities.
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To explore this puzzle, I focus initially on whether digital startups iterate products with
regular rhythms, and then consider how this propensity is shaped by their market
diversification.
Design iteration rhythms
A number of strategy scholars have focused on the role of regular rhythms in structuring
ongoing changes. In this work, researchers treat regular rhythms as a proactive, clockbased manner of changing (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick, 1994; Turner et al.,
2013). The core theoretical arguments are rooted in organizational routines, which have
been regarded as the primary means by which organizations accomplish much of what
they do (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Nelson and Winter, 1982). As firms employ such
routines, they produce regularity in the timing of changes, implying that these activities
will be distributed relatively equally across time. Therefore, if digital startups use regular
rhythms, the timing of design iteration will be strongly influenced by the passage of clock
time.
The behavioral basis underlying the use of regular iteration rhythms centers on the
need for coordination in design iteration activities (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Turner et
al., 2010). As an illustrative quote from my empirical setting, a prominent mobile game
producer said, “I work with our product managers, quality assurance, and marketing
every day ... I also work with our engineering and art teams … I release app updates
every three weeks, so this is a highly cyclical process, but it is a little different each time
because each new update contains different features, tech, and content” (Taylor, 2019).
When design iterations are introduced according to consistent time intervals, digital
startups can increasingly draw on historical precedent to help govern the process of
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iteration. By timing design iterations to fit this established temporal pattern, the parties
involved in improving the product are able to focus scarce attention resources (Greve,
2003; Ocasio, 1997), and utilize efficient means of coordination, e.g., leveraging
historical precedence and reducing explicit communications (Becker, 2004; Cohen &
Bacdayan, 1994). Moreover, while this regular, structured way of change decouples
digital startups from responding to the relentless shifts of external environments, it allows
for enough adaptation to roughly keep up with the turbulent environment. Thus, the
concern for coordination incentivizes digital startups to adopt regular iteration rhythms.
Following prior literature (Turner et al., 2013), I capture the use of regular
rhythms with temporal fit, which accounts for the alignment of time intervals with prior
design iteration. For digital startups that use regular design iteration rhythms, the time
intervals between design iterations should be similar. The likelihood of iteration increases
when the time since last design iteration is consistent with the time interval for prior
design iterations.
Hypothesis 1. Digital startups will be more likely to release their design iterations with
rhythms. In other words, there is a positive association between the extent of temporal fit
and design iteration.
Configuring design iteration rhythms in diverse markets
As presented in the prior section, my core logic posits that digital startups tend to enact
design iteration with regular rhythms to diminish the difficulties in internal coordination.
Next, I theorize how different types of market diversification shape the propensity to use
regular rhythms. Digital startups can rapidly access multiple markets through digital
affordances (e.g., iOS app store) with little costs (Shaheer & Li, 2020; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee,
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2008). It is well recognized that competing in multiple markets simultaneously creates
interdependencies that result in tremendous coordination costs (Jones & Hill, 1988; Zhou,
2011). In extending this logic, high market diversification may drive firms to use regular
design iteration rhythms. Conversely, market diversification may expose startups to
increasing numbers of external changes and urgent incidents that require responsiveness.
Thus, I seek to explore how startups configure design iteration rhythms to address the
challenges associated with market diversification. Specifically, I focus on two different
types of market diversification—namely platform diversification and international
diversification—as important factors that shape iteration rhythms. I argue that different
types of market diversification create distinct challenges for digital startups, and exert
opposing influences on the use of regular iteration rhythms.
Platform diversification. Platform diversification has been increasingly adopted
by digital startups—that is, they develop digital products/services across multiple
operating system platforms, aiming to reach as many potential users as possible (Corts &
Lederman, 2009; Tanriverdi̇ & Lee, 2008). Platforms such as iOS and Android are
technology infrastructures that orchestrate the functioning of ecosystems and set the rules
for participation by complementor firms (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Moreover, across
platforms, the technological specifications are quite distinct from one another. For
example, in the iOS platform directed by Apple, digital startups mostly develop mobile
apps using SWIFT language, release through the Apple App store, and interact with
iPhone/iPads on iOS operating systems, while the Android ecosystem is completely
different.
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When diversified across different platforms, it is important for digital startups to
acquire platform-specific knowledge and figure out the interdependencies to compete on
multiple platforms. In terms of the technological environment, the product designs must
be tailored to a platform’s core technological functions and interface specifications
(Cennamo & Santalo, 2019). Yet, it is imperative to keep products mostly consistent
across platforms, as users expect to have a similar experience across different platforms.
Moreover, in some cases, the function of firms’ offerings even requires real-time
consistency in the products/services across platforms (e.g., cross-platform online gaming).
Thus, digital startups must consider how to feasibly produce the same design iteration in
multiple platforms. As Mike Blank, the vice president of Origin and EA Access, said,
“Trying to provide the best experience for players when all of these variables are at play
is really complex. And so I think over the next two to five years, we’ll learn more about
how one might be able to bring a game to multiple devices and how you might be able to
traverse across different kinds of platforms.”
To compete in multiple platform markets, digital startups are subject to stronger
pressure to pursue regular design iteration rhythms, as platform diversification can
increase the burden of internal coordination. Since the cross-platform offerings of
startups need to remain mostly consistent, the decision to change product designs on one
platform typically means that it has to be replicated on other platforms, sometimes even
in real-time. Given the distinct technological environments, development teams within
digital startups that focus on particular platforms have to engage in ongoing
communication to understand the factors affecting each other’s decisions and track the
interrelated decisions that are made (Becker and Murphy, 1992). This reflects the greater
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effort required to understand and process the content and progress of interrelated
activities, which translates into more opportunities for errors in decision-making
(Levinthal, 1997). Thus, I expect the use of regular design iteration rhythms to be more
pronounced when digital startups have high platform diversification, as the coordination
burden imposed by such diversification may lead startups to rely more on regular
rhythms. Put differently, in the presence of high platform diversification, digital startups
are more likely to iterate with regular rhythms.
Hypothesis 2. When faced with high platform diversification, digital startups’ use of
regular design iteration rhythms is strengthened.
International diversification. While platform diversification strengthens the
incentives for using regular design iteration rhythms, I argue that digital startups may
face strong external pressures to be responsive when competing in diverse country
markets. International diversification is typically manifest in increased geographic
dispersion of the product market, as firms need to take into account ever-increasing
numbers of suppliers, customers, and competitors (Hitt et al., 1994; Kostova & Zaheer,
1999). Digital startups using international diversification strategies are exposed to distinct
institutional environments and social expectations (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Su & Tsang,
2015), and they need to meet the expectations of heterogeneous external stakeholders
from diverse markets. For example, design iteration timing may involve taking into
account activities like rival actions, consumer demand shifts (e.g., sales holidays), market
developments (e.g., industry conferences), or evaluations from external capital sources
(e.g., venture capitalists) in multiple countries. Thus, digital startups are more likely to be
responsive to external changes when iterating their products.
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Maintaining regular rhythms and being responsive are less likely to be conflicting
if the core product is targeting a single country market, where there are fewer important
stakeholders that digital startups need to pay attention to (Pahnke et al., 2015; PerezNordtvedt et al., 2008). Thus, they are in a better position to comprehend or even foresee
the moves of stakeholders. Moreover, there may exist dominant rhythms in the market
that all related stakeholders adhere to (e.g., one-month shutdown of business around the
Spring Festival in China every year), which are easier to incorporate when developing
design iteration rhythms. As a result, there is a higher probability for coming up with a
regular rhythm that balances the need of internal coordination and roughly keeping up
with changes in the market. Thus, when competing in a single country market, digital
startups are more likely to maintain a regular design iteration rhythm, because they are in
a better position to proactively take into consideration the occasional external changes.
However, when international diversification is high, maintaining regular rhythms
and being responsive are more likely to be conflicting. Specifically, if their products
target multiple countries, digital startups may face a more challenging situation where
external opportunities and urgent incidents are frequent and difficult to predict, given
limited information processing capability. And it will be difficult to develop a regular
rhythm that aligns well with the diverse country conditions they face. Thus, to navigate in
multimarket, fast-changing environments, digital startups have to be responsive and
flexible with their design iteration timing, which shifts the balance towards being
responsive in multiple countries at the expense of coordination efficiencies afforded by
regular rhythms. As an illustration, users from different countries may exhibit varying
degrees of desire for design iteration in the mobile game context. For example, whereas
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Korean mobile game users are eager to experience new game designs through updates
once every two weeks, users in Vietnam are more accustomed to a much slower rate, e.g.,
about once every two months. In this situation, mobile game publishers competing in
both markets may be less regular in their design iterations given the unique demands in
each country. Thus, international diversification increases the pressure for being
responsive, and decreases digital startups’ strategic emphasis on regular design iteration
rhythms.
Hypothesis 3. When faced with high international diversification, digital startups’
propensity to use regular design iteration rhythms is weakened.
METHODS
Empirical context
To test my hypotheses, I examine design iteration rhythms in the context of the global
mobile game industry. Mobile gaming (smartphone and tablet) has become a $69 billion
global business, which took up 45% of the global games market in 2019 (NewZoo, 2019).
This industry provides a great empirical setting in which to examine design iteration in a
fast-evolving context. The challenge to stay relevant in the marketplace through frequent
game updates is well-recognized among mobile game publishers, as is the typical
resource requirements for investing in updates. Industry experts estimate that about 5090% of the resources devoted to product development are spent on the iteration process
after products are released into the market (Li et al., 2017).
Specifically, the data foundation is based on the games category on the iOS
platform. Games are the largest category in the mobile apps industry, both in terms of
share of the total number of mobile apps (24.9% in iOS) and revenue (e.g., in terms of
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revenue, seven of the top 10 apps subcategories are part of the games category). Thus,
games capture a major segment in the mobile apps industry. The update form of design
iteration is also an important element of competing in game apps, with the update rate of
top game apps among the highest in the apps industry. To better familiarize ourselves
with the industry context, I conducted interviews with a number of developers of game
apps. One described the importance of design iteration in the form of updates as follows,
“Update is a question of life or death for a mobile game, because users would get bored
playing the same game within a month. The best way to survive is to update new content
regularly.”
Data
The primary source of the data was acquired from a leading analyst firm in the mobile
intelligence sector. The firm tracks and archives information related to all mobile apps
developed for the iOS platform. Its data are extensively used by app developers, venture
capital firms, and financial analysts.
Our data set comprises detailed mobile apps information for the period from
January 1st 2015 to December 31st 2018 across the 58 major iOS country markets that
were available from the analyst firm. I obtained information on app updates, daily ratings,
basic app characteristics and developer traits from the analyst firm. While the firm is
widely viewed as a legitimate source of industry data/information, as a further check on
the validity of the data, I verified that rankings and ratings of the top 20 apps in the
acquired data matched corresponding information from two other providers of mobile
apps data (most mobile app data providers offer free access to select information on
recent top ranked apps).
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Following prior literature using mobile apps datasets (Ghose and Han, 2014;
Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), I focused on a “top segmentation” approach to collect the
sample. The distribution of app revenues and downloads is heavily skewed and exhibits a
long-tail shape. Based on a joint report by Prior Data and Pollen VC (2016), more than
half (55%) of app store revenue in 2015 was generated by the top 100 apps, with the rest
taken up by the other 1,500,000 apps. Further, when consumers are browsing apps by
category, the Apple App Store only shows top apps on its page -- searching by keywords
is required to reach the rest -- creating a huge difference in market exposure between top
apps and others (Ghose and Han, 2014). Thus, app publishers that have top ranked apps
create and capture the major part of value in this sector.
As opposed to prior research which has used single-country data (Ghose and Han
2014; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), the data spanning many countries have enabled us to
construct an international ranking that comprises the top ranked apps worldwide by
revenue. To achieve this goal, I adopted a sampling strategy similar to Kapoor and
Agarwal (2017). I used top grossing game apps that ranked in the top 500 in each month
from Jan 2015 to Dec 2018 in 58 countries in the iOS game category as the initial pool
for the sample. Then, due to my focus on digital startups, I tracked the mobile game
publishers of these apps and kept only those that have released one game, giving us a
final sample of 110 firms.6 I focus on digital startups which only released one product,
6

To check whether the sample is composed of startups (i.e., de novo) or established firms

diversifying into the mobile game category (i.e., de alio), I looked closely at a random
sub-sample of 50 firms in this pool and searched for their firm information in Crunchbase
database, a widely-used startup-centered data source, and other online resources. All of
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because iteration of their core product at the early stages likely matters the most to them.
In comparison, established firms that have a wide array of products to generate revenues
do not need to pay particular attention to iteration of all products. The age of these
startups is on average 3.6 years, with 83% of them lower than 5 years and the eldest
being 8 years old. As reported later, my analyses also included robustness checks that use
alternative selection criteria.
Variables and measurement
Following prior literature (Turner et al., 2013), I examined the use of regular rhythms in
terms of the relationship between the temporal fit with the prior design iteration and the
probability of releasing the next design iteration. Specifically, temporal fit accounts for
the alignment of time intervals with prior design iteration. For digital startups that use
regular design iteration rhythms, the time intervals between design iterations should be
similar. Thus, I expect the likelihood of releasing a design iteration to increase when the
time since previous design iteration is consistent with the time interval for prior design
iterations (see Figure 3.1 for visual clarification).
Dependent variable. To empirically examine design iteration, this study focused
on the game update, which is a binary event with values equaling one for the day in
which the focal mobile game publisher released a new version of its game and zero
otherwise. To identify design iteration, I leveraged the widely used three-digit naming
convention (i.e., Version 1.2.0, 3.7.2) for game updates. Typically, an increment in the
first-digit or the second-digit means visible improvements or changes in interface,
the 50 single-product firms were stand-alone startup firms, rather than established
companies entering in the mobile game category.
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features and functionality; and an increment in the third-digit implies bug fixes, which are
corrective in nature and do not reflect revamped product designs. In other words, an
increment in the first- or second-digit represents a design iteration, i.e., a substantial
advance relative to the existing product design. I discussed the concept of design iteration
with industry experts who specialize in mobile game development, and they confirmed
that the three-digit naming method is the norm in the mobile game industry. They also
confirmed that operationalizing mobile game iterations as an increment in the first or
second digits would provide an appropriate distinction from corrective/minimal product
adjustments (i.e., bug fixes). In sum, I have a sample of 110 mobile game publishers that
release first-digit and second-digit games updates in a recurring manner, amounting to
1,023 game update events during the observation period.
Explanatory variables. Temporal Misfit7 represents the difference between the
number of days since the most recent design iteration release and the number of days
required to release the most recent design iteration. To reflect misfit, I took the absolute
value of this difference and log-transform it to reflect my expectation of a diminishing
effect. The temporal misfit measure indicates the extent to which the occurrence of a
design iteration on a given day, if one were to occur, would be consistent with the
7

In building on prior research, I selected temporal misfit (Turner et al., 2013) as my

independent variable, rather than time since previous innovation (Turner et al., 2010).
The two measures are different in that the former captures organization-specific temporal
patterns, while the latter is based on the idea that there is a typical time interval for
introducing generational innovations in an industry. Since my argument focuses on the
existence of routines in specific publishers, I used temporal misfit for my focal results.
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historical release pattern for the sole product of the firm. This operationalization aligns
with arguments and empirical work in the rhythms literature (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997;
Turner et al., 2013).
Platform diversification is operationalized based on a multihoming/cross-platform
indicator. It equals to 1 when the focal game is listed in both iOS and Android platforms
and 0 otherwise; a value of 0 indicates that the focal game is only on the iOS platform
(Ghose & Han, 2014; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Because software development kits are
different for different platforms, the development of one game on two platforms typically
requires attaining the same functionality within two distinct development platforms.
For international diversification, the measure is based on an inverse HHI index
that captures the geographical dispersion of markets (Cannon & St. John, 2007; Hitt et al.,
1994). For the iOS platform, global market is divided by country boundaries, so that there
is a separate Apple Store in each country. The inverse HHI index is based on the
revenues from each country. To calculate the measure, I started at the fine-grained level
of the firm-country market-day by calculating the revenues. Then, I ranked the country
market for each app-day by the revenues in a descending way. Next, I calculated Pn,t ,
which is the proportion of the revenues for country n relative to the total revenues for the
top five countries for the given app on the focal day t. The inverse HHI index is
represented as 1- [(P1,t)2 + (P2,t)2 + (P3,t)2+ (P4,t)2+ (P5,t)2]. The value is close to 1 when the
digital startup is exposed to multiple countries (markets) and generates equivalent
revenues from each country, and it is close to 0 when the digital startup focuses on one
country (or only a few) with corresponding concentration in revenue generation.
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Control variables. I controlled for a number of covariates that may influence the
rate of design iteration for a mobile game. I used the number of prior design iterations of
the game as a proxy for design iteration experience, from the view that such experience
may affect subsequent design iteration activities (e.g., Turner et al., 2013). I also included
separate controls for the number of bug fixes (game updates that incur third-digit
changes), which may affect the likelihood of future design iteration. Pricing strategy
directly determines the competitors and consumers that an app deals with and thereby
may influence iteration behavior (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Therefore, I controlled for
"free strategy" through a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the digital startup
offers its product for free and 0 otherwise.8 I also controlled for age restriction of product
offering, which can help to control for the potential influence of targeting heterogeneous
consumers in that way. Design iteration may also be influenced by the game size and
product lifecycle. As such, I controlled for game size—the number of bytes of the game
file (in thousands, log-transformed), and game age, which is the number of days (log
transformed) since the initial release of its product on the iOS platform. In the sample, I
expect that game age is likely to correspond closely with firm age.
At a subcategory level, there may be differences in the competitive intensity for
iteration across types of games. For example, chess games involve a lower iteration rate
compared to First-person Shooting (FPS) games. To consider the potential for a

8

Free strategy refers to app pricing models that provide fundamental

content/functionality for free (Pauwels and Weiss 2008), with revenue originating from
third-parties (e.g., advertisers) or by charging consumers fees for premium content.
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confounding influence of subcategory differences, I also included fixed effects for game
subcategories (16 subcategories in game category).
To rule out the possibility that design iteration rhythms are driven by competitors
or complementors (e.g., iOS upgrade rhythm), I included as a control competitors’
iterations, measured as the number of first-digit and second-digit updates released by
other games in the same subcategory in the prior month, and I also controlled for major
iterations at the platform level as a complementary innovation indicator. Since there is a
major iOS update in June every year, I observed three new versions for the iOS platform
between January 2015 and December 2018.
Analytical approach
We analyzed the likelihood of a digital startup introducing a design iteration for its
mobile app game on a given day with parametric event history analysis, which allows
analysis of the occurrence of an event by incorporating longitudinal data with timevarying covariates. I updated all time-dependent variables on a daily basis. I selected the
exponential distribution, which is suitable for modeling data with a constant hazard given
no prior expectation as to the nature of the distribution (Folta & Miller, 2002; Turner et
al., 2010). The coefficient results are presented in a hazard format. In the hazard format, a
positive coefficient reflects an increase in the instantaneous rate of iteration (game
update). Also, in that design iteration behavior could be correlated within the same digital
startup, I ran a shared frailty model, which is a random effects model for event history
analysis. I also used the Cox model and several other alternatives to account for the
possibility that the distribution of design iteration probability is not constant. These
additional analyses will be explained further in my discussion of robustness tests.
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Results
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics and the correlations between covariates. Table 3.2
presents the results examining all the hypotheses in Model 1-6. The interpretation of
interaction effects in nonlinear models is complex because the effect depends on the
value of both interacting variables and other variables (Ai & Norton, 2003; Hoetker,
2007). To overcome such interpretation challenges for event history analysis, I employed
two sets of approaches to interpret the results. First, in the main results, I interpret
coefficients in terms of multiplicative effects, which have been recognized as an intuitive
and natural interpretation approach for event history analysis (Buis, 2010; Geng et al.,
2016).9 Second, given that the multiplicative effect does not gauge the linear change in
9

There are well-known marginal effects interpretation challenges associated with non-

linear models (Bowen and Wiersema, 2004). Marginal effects are interpreted as the
change in predicted dependent variable when the independent variable increases by one
unit – d(y)/d(x). An implication of this nonlinearity for hypothesis testing is that the value
of an estimated coefficient does not equal the true size of marginal effect, as the value of
d(y)/d(x) is not constant across all x values. To precisely describe the varying effects for
event history models, a multiplicative approach is recommended (Buis, 2010; Geng et al.,
2016) because multiplicative effects do not vary with the baseline hazard rate and other
variables due to the exponential formula. With the multiplicative approach – d(lny)/d(x),
the adapted marginal effects are constant and easier to interpret. The adapted marginal
effects indicate the ratio by which the dependent variable changes for a unit change in an
explanatory variable, i.e., how does the hazard rate change as a percentage of the baseline
value when there is one-unit change in the focal explanatory variable.
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the probability of iteration release, I also show the change in the hazard rate holding all
covariates at mean levels (with the dummy variable Free held at 0) using recommended
graphical analysis (Hoetker, 2007). I also conducted simple slope tests, as suggested by
Aiken and West (1991), to more clearly understand the interaction results. Specifically, I
examined the statistical significance, and interpreted the practical significance of the
effect of temporal misfit at different levels of moderators using STATA margins and
marginsplot commands (Cleves et al., 2016).
Model 1 is the baseline model with control variables. This model indicates that
the rate of design iteration increases with platform diversification, game size,
competitors’ moves, and decreases with prior number of design iterations, prior bug fixes,
and age. Model 2 includes the effect of temporal misfit. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the
results indicate a significant negative effect, such that as temporal misfit increases, the
likelihood of iteration decreases (coefficient= -0.384, p<0.001). Based on the results from
Model 2, a 10.0% increase in temporal misfit is associated with a 3.6% decrease in the
predicted probability of design iteration.10 Alternatively, to capture linear change in
10

The standard interpretation of a coefficient β in a regression analysis is that a one-unit

change in the independent variable results in β change in the expected value of the
dependent variable. In other words, when independent variable changes from a to b, the
dependent variable would change from x to y accordingly, where β = (y-x)/(b-a). Given
that both independent and dependent variables are log transformed in my study (our
independent variable is log transformed temporal misfit and survival analysis reports
log(hazard rate of update)), a one-unit change in log(temporal misfit) results in β change
in log(hazard rate of update). To interpret how change in temporal misfit (e.g., temporal
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design iteration probability, the results indicate that, holding all variables at mean levels,
when temporal misfit increases from its mean level to one standard deviation above the
mean, the hazard rate of iteration decreases by 42.7% (from 0.0089 to 0.0051).
Models 3 and 5 addressed Hypothesis 2, which predicts that temporal misfit will
have a greater (i.e., more negative) effect on the rate of iteration when platform
diversification is high. I tested this hypothesis by including interaction terms between
platform diversification and temporal misfit. The result indicates a negative and
significant coefficient (p<0.01 in Model 3 and p<0.001 in Model 5) for the interaction
term, supporting Hypothesis 2. Further support for Hypothesis 2 is provided by simple
slope tests using Model 3. The results show that the effect of temporal misfit is
statistically significant when platform diversification is low or high. A 10.0% increase in
temporal misfit is associated with a 2.5% decrease in the predicted probability of iteration
(p<0.001) when the digital startup only competes on one platform market, and a 3.9%
decrease in the predicted probability of iteration (p<0.001) when the digital startup
competes on both iOS and Android platform markets.
Models 4 and 5 examined Hypothesis 3. It predicts that as international
diversification increases, the relationship between temporal misfit and the likelihood of
iteration release weakens (i.e., becomes less negative). As expected, the positive and
misfit changes from a to b) leads to change in hazard rate of update (e.g., hazard rate
changes from x to y), the equation should be β = [log(y)-log(x)]/ [log(b)-(a)]. It can be
simplified as y/x =(b/a)β. To interpret the coefficient, I make b/a = 1.1 or 110%,
indicating a 10% increase in the number of days of temporal misfit from a to b would
change the predicted probability of update by (1.1β-1)*100%, from x to y.
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significant coefficient (p<0.001 in Models 4 and 5) for the interaction term indicates less
use of regular rhythms for digital startups competing under more diverse markets. A
10.0% increase in temporal misfit is associated with a 4.4% decrease in the predicted
probability of iteration (p<0.001) when international diversification is low, a 3.6%
decrease in the predicted probability of iteration (p<0.001) when international
diversification is at the mean level, and a 2.8% decrease in the predicted probability of
iteration (p<0.001) when international diversification is high.
To aid the interpretation of the moderation effects from non-linear models,
Hoetker (2007) recommends the use of graphical analysis of marginal effects for values
of the independent and moderator variables. By presenting a series of plots of predicted
probabilities with high/low level of moderators, I manage to capture the change in
iteration release probability across important contingencies. As Figure 3.2 shows per
Hypothesis 2, when the startup firms’ game is diversified across two platforms (iOS and
Android), i.e., high platform diversification, there is a sharper negative effect associated
with increasing temporal misfit. In contrast, the curve exhibits a flatter negative
association if involving only one platform. Figure 3.3 provides further support for
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood of iteration drops more sharply as temporal misfit increases
for low international diversification. In comparison, the curve is flatter when international
diversification is high.
Robustness tests
We employed several sets of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of my results.
First, as a granular examination, I conducted two tests, each focusing on one type of
design iteration. In constructing the current dependent variable, I included both first-digit
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and second-digit updates as design iterations. Given that the number of second-digit
updates is about 4.9 times more than the number of first-digit updates, I sought to explore
whether my results that digital startups use rhythms to arrange design iterations are
mostly driven by the second-digit updates. Thus, I reconstructed two separate datasets,
each focusing on one type of design iteration. I found that all hypotheses are supported
even if I look at the first-digit and second-digit updates separately, indicating the
existence of rhythms in both 1-digit and 2-digit design iteration activity. In addition, I
conducted several tests with the full sample and main model to further mitigate the
concern that prior first-digit and second-digit updates play different roles in setting up
rhythms. Specifically, I added into the main analyses three control variables, with one
indicating whether the type of the most recent design iteration is first-digit/second-digit,
and another two indicating the time since the most recent first-digit update and the time
since the most recent second-digit update. All of my hypotheses remain supported.
Second, I examined alternative operationalizations of temporal misfit. In my focal
analyses, I operationalized temporal misfit by taking the log transformed difference
between the number of days since the most recent iteration release and the number of
days required to release the most recent iteration for the focal product, assuming
symmetric effects across early and late sides of temporal misfit. As one robustness check,
I allowed for asymmetric effects between the early side (when the number of days since
most recent iteration release is smaller than the number of days required to release the
most recent iteration) and the late side (when the number of days since most recent
iteration release is larger than the number of days required to release the most recent
iteration) of temporal misfit by rerunning the same model using subsamples. In the early
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side, all of my hypotheses are strongly supported, while in the late side, the main effect is
still supported but the results for both moderating effects do not reach conventional levels
of statistical significance. I speculate that the lack of support for moderating effects on
the late side could result from different managerial mentalities when being early and
being late. When being early, publishers may still have the latitude to adjust mobile
update timing depending on different conditions. Yet, when being late, publishers may be
focused on iterating as fast as possible, rather than considering other contingencies like
the market diversification conditions.
Third, since the release of design iterations for the same digital startup may be
correlated, I used a shared frailty model, also known as the random-effect model for
event history analysis, to account for such correlation. The results remain consistent after
using the shared frailty model.
Fourth, I adjusted the sample and analysis technique to mitigate the concern that
the risk of releasing design iteration is close to zero right after the release of the prior
iteration. Specifically, I dropped the 10% observations for each episode of design
iteration that are closest to the release of the prior design iteration. All of my hypotheses
are still significantly supported. I also used the Cox model, which does not assume a
constant hazard of design iteration over time. The findings with the Cox model are
consistent with my main results.
DISCUSSION
Design iterations are of critical importance for digital startups to compete in today’s
business landscape. Practitioner insights on design iteration approaches have suggested
that digital startups maneuver design iterations through regular rhythms, which exhibit
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consistent time intervals between design iterations. Yet, this emphasis on regular rhythms
runs counter to the received wisdom of being responsive, particularly in the digital sector.
Given this tension, I sought to investigate whether digital startups use regular rhythms for
iteration, and if so, what factors condition the use of regular rhythms. I argue that digital
startups have coordination-based incentives for regular rhythms, and found evidence that
digital startups do tend to iterate with regular rhythms. Moreover, I theorize that different
types of market diversification expose digital startups to distinct challenges, and exert
opposing influences on design iteration rhythms. In turn, I found that the enactment of
regular design iteration rhythms is more pronounced if digital startups compete across
multiple platform markets and is less pronounced if they compete in multiple country
markets. My ideas and findings provide the basis for several important literature
contributions.
First, I contribute to understanding of design iteration rhythms as a critical
innovation strategy. Design iteration aims to meet a specific market need by repetitively
testing and adjusting product designs (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). It is often seen by
technology scholars as an effort of product refinement before releasing on the market
(e.g., Thomke and Bell, 2001), which mostly assumes an enduring need and stable market
conditions. Yet, the increasingly turbulent business environment suggests design iteration
may have new significance. If design iteration in stable environments acts like hitting a
fixed target, in changing environments, it seeks to keep up with a moving target. Iteration
enables firms to keep up with market changes (e.g., evolving user needs, regulatory
changes) by altering product designs and learning from market feedback. Without design
iteration, firms risk innovating for a market which may be short-lived or even no longer
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exists (Iansiti and MacCormack, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). Thus, there has been a
burst of use of design iteration among practitioners. However, I know little about how
firms organize iteration.
We argue that rhythms are of particular importance for managing design iteration.
On the one hand, design iteration rhythms directly determine whether digital startups can
continuously sense and capture the flow of opportunities. For example, if consumer tastes
change every three months, then iterating with the same rhythm may help digital startups
quickly learn about the new demand and adjust their product offerings accordingly. On
the other hand, rhythms shape the cost structure of design iteration activities. A regular
rhythm has been argued to have lower costs for cross-function coordination and
absorbing new information, which are vital for digital startups to efficiently perform
design iteration. Thus, I highlight the role of design iteration rhythms to keep firms
innovative, particularly in a turbulent business environment.
Second, my work contributes to strategic rhythms research by reconciling the
tension between using regular rhythms and being responsive. Extant rhythms literature
has mostly agreed that firms pursue regular rhythms to enhance internal organization
(Ahuja et al., 2013; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Turner et al.,
2013; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). Firms using regular rhythms appear to prioritize
internal focus and decouple from the external environment. However, an underlying
motivation to develop strategic rhythms is so firms can keep up with the external
environment (Perez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008). Therefore, I also investigate how the use of
regular rhythms may be shaped by market conditions.
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To do so, I examine how digital startups configure design iteration rhythms to
compete in diverse markets. Competing simultaneously in diverse markets has been
recognized as a critical and pervasive challenge for digital startups (Chen et al., 2018;
Shaheer and Li, 2020). If they focus exclusively on regular design iteration rhythms, their
design iteration timing will not take into account factors tied to market diversification.
The results show that different types of market diversification exhibit opposing
influences on iteration rhythms, with platform diversification facilitating the use of
design iteration rhythms while international diversification inhibits it. I argue that
emphasis on regular rhythms versus being responsive depends on the degree to which
firms prioritize internal coordination versus external pressure. Specifically, platform
diversification can generate a considerable coordination burden in development processes,
enhancing the need for regular rhythms. In contrast, when international diversification
adds to external pressure to respond to heterogenous needs, firms have great incentive to
take care of urgent incidents; thus, firms may compromise coordination benefits in order
to keep up with the environment. Digital startups configure their rhythms in different
directions to deal with the distinctive challenges of market diversification. Therefore,
enacting design iteration timing can involve tradeoffs between coordination and
responding to external changes.
Our work on design iteration rhythms also has important implications for
understanding organizations’ dynamic capabilities. Specifically, my investigation
uncovers routinized, organized patterns in design iteration. The adoption of routines may
manifest themselves as higher order capabilities, like dynamic capabilities (Helfat &
Winter, 2011), which are widely regarded as vital factors that help businesses initiate and
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manage changes. Moreover, my work can contribute to an important debate surrounding
the dynamic capabilities perspective, as to whether capabilities and processes tend to be
similar or heterogenous across firms (Barreto, 2010). In contrast to the view that dynamic
capabilities are heterogenous across firms (Teece et al., 1997), my findings are more
consistent with the “best practice” view (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), which suggests that
there is a commonly accepted way to “hit a golf ball” with some idiosyncrasies.
Third, my study sheds light on how firms compete on the edge of chaos. The
initial case studies by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, 1998) propose that firms competing
on the edge may employ strategies like regular rhythms of change to structure the chaos
and randomness. When the turbulence and complexity of external environments go
beyond managers’ bounded rationality, Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) theorize that
managers rely on temporal heuristics like rhythms, which can be acquired and updated in
a learning by doing approach. To date, little has been done along this intriguing line, to
investigate whether firms can still accomplish regular rhythms or be pushed off the edge
when confronted by a more uncontrollable, incomprehensible environment. I are among
the first to empirically scrutinize this proposition. Grounded in a turbulent environment,
the digital economy, my results indicate that digital startups enact regular rhythms.
Further, I investigate how digital startups modify regular rhythms when competing in
diverse markets. I find that the diversification of digital startups may either reinforce or
weaken the use of regular design iteration rhythms. Specifically, they strongly adhere to
regular rhythms when competing across interdependent (platform) markets and
frequently break out regular rhythms when competing across heterogeneous (country)
markets. Thus, this study contributes to extant understanding of how firms compete on
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the edge of chaos by arguing and finding that firms’ use of regular rhythms is contingent
upon the market conditions they are faced with.
In addition, my study also contributes to our understanding about the digital
entrepreneurship phenomenon. Despite the economic significance of digital startups, the
related literature is still nascent, with only a few conceptual papers clarifying their digital
underpinnings (Eden, 2018). It is known that given their modular digital architecture,
digital startups can be very flexible to rapidly shift across a wide range of possible
configurations of product designs (Yoo et al., 2012; McKinley et al., 2013). Moreover,
digital startups are able to quickly access diverse markets through digital affordances,
which allows for early and rapid international growth (Chen et al., 2019) and platform
diversification (Tanriverdi̇ and Lee, 2008). I dive into the entanglement between these
two characteristics of digital startups. In addition, given the lack of theoretical
development on this phenomenon, I bring strategy-by-doing (Eisenhardt and Bingham,
2017; Ott et al., 2017) into it. I see a valuable opportunity to bridge these two largely
separate literatures to date and demonstrate how such a bridge can advance both
literatures in significant ways.
CONCLUSION
This study contributes to our understanding of design iteration rhythms as an important
strategy to manage innovation, particularly in the digital sector. I argue that digital
startups prefer to iterate with regular rhythms rather than being responsive. Further, this
study proposes a novel argument that the use of regular design iteration rhythms can be
either facilitated or hindered when competing in diverse markets, depending on the type
of market diversification. I reconcile the tension between using regular rhythms and
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being responsive by showing that the enactment of design iteration timing is a balancing
act between internal coordination and external pressure.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

1
2
3
4
5

Design iteration
Temporal misfit
Platform diversification
International diversification
Prior iteration
Prior bug fixes
Free game
Age restriction of game
content
Game size
Game age restriction
Competitor
Complementor

Design iteration
Temporal misfit
Platform diversification
International
diversification
Prior iteration
Prior bug fixes
Free game
Age restriction of game
content
Game size
Game age restriction
Competitor
Complementor

Mean
0.012
4.057
0.769
0.453
8.628
8.229
0.947

S.D.
0.111
1.460
0.421
0.318
6.964
9.184
0.224

Min
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000

Max
1.000
7.416
1.000
1.000
38.000
41.000
1.000

10.953

3.937

4.000

17.000

0.382
6.332
4.760
0.081

0.592
0.923
0.457
0.273

0.026
0.000
2.398
0.000

3.190
7.975
5.677
1.000

1
1.000
-0.078
-0.007

2

3

5

6

1.000
0.119

1.000

-0.001

0.007

0.233

1.000

0.026
-0.028
0.005

-0.193
0.191
0.011

0.128
0.132
-0.039

0.180
-0.055
-0.123

1.000
0.077
-0.041

1.000
0.059

0.005

-0.067

0.036

-0.012

0.084

-0.212

0.001
-0.044
0.016
0.005

0.018
0.414
-0.046
0.015

-0.119
0.206
-0.168
0.006

-0.032
0.149
-0.075
0.014

0.105
0.371
0.184
0.031

0.026
0.300
0.179
0.027

7

8

9

10

11

12

Design iteration
Temporal misfit
Platform diversification
International
diversification
Prior iteration
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4

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Prior bug fixes
Free game
Age restriction of game
content
Game size
Game age restriction
Competitor
Complementor

1.000
0.287

1.000

0.092
-0.054
0.109
-0.004

0.048
-0.063
0.065
-0.003
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1.000
0.092
0.127
0.003

1.000
0.043
0.029

1.000
0.047

1.000

Table 3.2 Estimates for Temporal Misfit and Design Iteration
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.384
(0.026)
[0.000]

-0.267
(0.052)
[0.000]

-0.509
(0.043)
[0.000]

-0.370
(0.056)
[0.000]

Independent variable
Temporal misfit

Interaction terms
Temporal misfit × Platform
diversification

-0.151

-0.234

(0.058)
[0.009]

(0.060)
[0.000]

Temporal misfit × International
diversification

Controls
Platform diversification

0.277

0.374

(0.076)
[0.000]

(0.080)
[0.000]

0.336
(0.086)
[0.000]

0.104
(0.091)
[0.255]

0.558
(0.200)
[0.005]

0.136
(0.092)
[0.138]

0.846
(0.207)
[0.000]

International diversification

0.069
(0.114)
[0.547]

-0.079
(0.125)
[0.528]

-0.103
(0.125)
[0.410]

-0.948
(0.271)
[0.000]

-1.293
(0.285)
[0.000]

Prior iterations

-0.029
(0.005)
[0.000]

0.022
(0.006)
[0.000]

0.022
(0.006)
[0.000]

0.022
(0.006)
[0.000]

0.023
(0.006)
[0.000]

Prior bug fixes

-0.028
(0.005)
[0.000]

-0.026
(0.005)
[0.000]

-0.027
(0.005)
[0.000]

-0.026
(0.005)
[0.000]

-0.027
(0.005)
[0.000]

Free

-0.038
(0.204)
[0.850]

0.177
(0.206)
[0.390]

0.187
(0.205)
[0.363]

0.197
(0.206)
[0.339]

0.216
(0.204)
[0.290]

Age restriction of game content

0.022
(0.013)
[0.080]

-0.013
(0.014)
[0.355]

-0.015
(0.014)
[0.277]

-0.015
(0.014)
[0.283]

-0.018
(0.014)
[0.179]

0.116

0.045

0.054

0.020

0.030

Game size
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(0.063)
[0.066]

(0.069)
[0.511]

(0.069)
[0.437]

(0.069)
[0.766]

(0.069)
[0.668]

Game age restriction

-0.242
(0.029)
[0.000]

-0.191
(0.041)
[0.000]

-0.190
(0.041)
[0.000]

-0.192
(0.041)
[0.000]

-0.192
(0.041)
[0.000]

Competitor

0.965
(0.147)
[0.000]

0.757
(0.157)
[0.000]

0.739
(0.157)
[0.000]

0.774
(0.158)
[0.000]

0.746
(0.158)
[0.000]

Complementor

0.102
(0.112)
[0.362]

0.170
(0.115)
[0.138]

0.176
(0.115)
[0.126]

0.165
(0.115)
[0.151]

0.172
(0.115)
[0.134]

Constant

-7.932
(0.753)
[0.000]

-5.655
(0.827)
[0.000]

-5.904
(0.832)
[0.000]

-5.340
(0.832)
[0.000]

-5.583
(0.834)
[0.000]

Subcategory FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
73291
73291
73291
73291
73291
Log likelihood
-622.2
-591.1
-589.0
-589.1
-581.8
Notes. Standard errors are included in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets. All
tests are two-tailed.
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Figure 3.1 Clarification of temporal fit

134

.06
.04
0

.02

0

100
200
Temporal Misfit (indicated in days)
Platform Diversification = 0

300

Platform Diversification = 1

Figure 3.2 Plot of the Predicted Probability of Design Iteration by Temporal Misfit and
Platform Diversification
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Figure 3.3 Plot of the Predicted Probability of Design Iteration by Temporal Misfit and
International Diversification
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